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 PREDICTING SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION TO REDUCE  
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
by 
Adam James Darnell 
Under the Direction of Rod Watts 
 
Abstracts 
Abstract for Literature Review 
The current degree of economic inequality in the US is the largest it has been 
since prior to the Great Depression and growing.  Economic inequality is linked to 
mortality, social capital, interpersonal trust, and democratic participation, beyond the 
effects of poverty.  Two main constructs are reviewed as predictors of support for efforts 
to reduce inequality: 1) distributive justice norms (equity and equality of outcome), and 
2) causal attributions (individual and structural).  Justification of the unequal status quo is 
often driven by reference to dominant cultural values personal responsibility and just 
deserts, which are likened to individual attributions and equity, respectively.  However, 
individuals may also recognize that economic outcomes are determined by structural 
factors such as discrimination and privilege.  Recognition that structural factors 
determine economic outcomes is referred to as systems analysis.  Systems analysis is 
expected to be unrelated to individual attributions, reflecting the common view that 
economic outcomes are determined by both individual and structural factors.  
 Furthermore, systems analysis is conceptualized as the central determinant of both the 
extent to which equality of outcome is desirable, despite prevailing preferences for 
equity, and the use of dominant cultural values as justifications for opposition to 
redistribution.  Because systems analysis reflects the view that resources are not 
distributed solely based on individual merit, it implies that resources are not distributed 
fairly.  This belief is expected to increase endorsement for equality of outcome and 
weaken negative effects of equity and individual attributions on support for 
redistribution.   
Abstract for Present Research 
Predictors of support for government action to reduce inequality were examined 
using the US sample (n = 1414) of the 1991 International Social Justice Project.  
Opposition to reducing inequality is often driven by reference to dominant cultural values 
such as the equity distributive justice norm and individualistic causal attributions.  The 
present study tested the hypothesis that supporters and opponents share a common 
endorsement of these dominant values, but differ in the extent to which they 
acknowledge that structural factors determine economic outcomes (defined as systems 
analysis).  Results indicated that the negative relationship between individual attributions 
and support for redistribution was only significant among participants with low systems 
analysis.   
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Chapter One: Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
This dissertation will examine attitudes toward economic inequality in the US.  In 
terms of income, a recent report by the Economic Policy Institute indicates that the top 
1% of income earners enjoy incomes 88.5 times larger than the bottom 20% of the US 
population (Economic Policy Institute [EPI], 2004b).   This disparity has exploded in 
recent years, up 55.4 points from 1979 and presently the largest it has been since just 
prior to the Great Depression (Center for Budget and Policy Priorities [CBPP], 2003).  
Incomes for the top 1% of the population increased 201% from 1979, compared to a 9% 
increase for the bottom fifth of earners (CBPP, 2003). In contrast, during the 1950s and 
60s incomes increased much more equally, roughly doubling for each income segment 
(EPI, 2004a).   In terms of actual numbers of people, the richest 1% of the population 
amounts to 2.8 million people, whose income as a group now exceeds the total income of 
the 110 million people who make up the bottom 40% of income earners (CBPP, 2003).  
The inequality picture is much worse when considering wealth (accumulated assets such 
as savings, stocks, and home equity).  In 2001, the top fifth of households held 84% of all 
wealth in the US, the middle fifth held only 3.9%, and the bottom fifth had negative 
holdings (EPI, 2004c).  In the United States, the degree of income inequality is the largest 
among developed nations (EPI, 2004a). 
The inequality picture is even worse when considering group-based economic 
inequality.  In 1998 women employed full-time still earned 75% less on average than 
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men employed full-time, and between-gender comparisons within the same occupation 
reveal similar disparities (Heintz & Folbre, 2000).  In terms of race/ethnicity, according 
to a 2004 Pew Hispanic Center report based on data from 1996-2002, the median income 
of African Americans and Latinos stood at roughly two-thirds that of Whites, whereas the 
median wealth of African Americans and Latinos is only one-tenth that of Whites. 
Looking at 2002 only, the median household wealth for Blacks was $5,988, for Latinos 
$7,932, and for Whites $88,651 (Pew Hispanic Center, 2004).  Furthermore, non-Whites 
are 162 times more likely than Whites to live in poverty (Wollman, 2004).  Neville, 
Worthington, and Spanierman (2001) report that among the luxuries Whites are more 
likely to enjoy are smaller class sizes, availability of computer technology in schools, 
graduation from college, steady employment during economic downturns, health 
insurance, recovery from certain diseases, more favorable housing, accessibility of home 
loans, and retirement investments (p. 263).   
There is evidence that economic inequality is detrimental to various indicators of 
personal and societal well-being.  Kawachi and colleagues (1997) reported a number of 
epidemiological studies, which have shown a strong positive relationship between 
income inequality and mortality, above and beyond effects of poverty.  They also 
demonstrated that income inequality makes its negative effects on health via decreases in 
social capital (i.e., civic engagement and interpersonal trust).  Lower levels of 
interpersonal trust have been associated elsewhere with increased economic inequality 
and decreased concern for the misfortunes of others (Uslaner, 2002).  Additionally, a 
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recent report by the American Political Science Association’s Taskforce on Inequality 
and American Democracy (2004) compiled findings from a wide range of empirical 
studies demonstrating that rising economic inequality is associated with inequalities 
between poor and rich persons in all forms of democratic participation including voting, 
contacting representatives, campaign contributions, membership in advocacy groups, and 
protest.  Findings such as these make it clear that the large and growing degree of 
economic inequality in the US is indeed a pressing social problem that is contrary to the 
public good and needs to be reduced.  The purpose of the present study is to identify 
attitudes that predict support for public efforts to reduce economic inequality.   
Popular Reactions to Inequality 
Attitudes toward economic inequality range from distress to justification.  
Arguments justifying inequality are driven by a host of underlying attitudes that are well-
represented in the writings of conservative economic commentators.  These include: 1) 
that inequality is a necessary by-product of a thriving capitalist economy which justly 
allocates different rewards to differently-abled persons (Hinderaker & Johnson, 1996), 2) 
that truly free markets function best (Friedman & Friedman, 1980), 3) that the 
functioning of the free market provides for an increased standard of living for all 
segments of the income distribution (Cox & Alm, 2000; Novak, 2000), and 4) that there 
is ample economic opportunity and upward mobility throughout the income distribution 
(Hinderaker & Johnson, 1996).  Justifications for inequality are also motivated by 
objections to the means by which inequality might be reduced.  Redistribution is most 
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objectionable to many Americans because it violates dominant cultural values of personal 
responsibility and just deserts (Bellah et al., 1985; Della Fave, 1986).  Redistribution is 
also rejected by reference to potential negative practical effects on both the successful 
(i.e., by decreasing incentives offered by reward-for-merit system) and the poor (i.e., by 
creating dependence).  Another common argument against calls for greater equality is 
that poverty, rather than inequality is the real problem (e.g., “A question of”, 2004).  
Essentially the argument follows, there is enough wealth to go around, and the poor can 
get wealthy without the rich losing a cent, and further that calls for equality beyond the 
alleviation of poverty are driven only by the envy of those who have less.  This argument 
diverts any of the objectionable implications for the wealthy made by calls for greater 
equality.   
In contrast, liberal and progressive economic analysts argue that such 
justifications for inequality lose credibility in light of evidence from comparably 
advanced economies.  The Economic Policy Institute (2004a) reports that upward 
mobility in the US is lower than in any other member nation of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the US has the highest levels of poor 
and chronically poor children among OECD nations, and accordingly, US social 
expenditures which serve to mitigate inequality were lower as a percentage of GDP than 
in any other developed nation.  The report adds that among the countries with more 
ample social welfare systems are nations with productivity levels that surpass those of the 
US.   
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Nevertheless, conservative economic commentators decry calls for greater 
equality as socialist or Marxist, citing the fall of the Soviet Union as abundant evidence 
that socialism failed and therefore, that equality is a bad idea [e.g., “Perfect economic 
equality is a nightmare: nothing short of a totalitarian tyranny could ever hope to achieve 
it” (“A question of”, 2004).]  However, in his book Equality (1981), William Ryan notes 
that equality of outcome is a “straw man” raised to dispel criticisms of inequality and 
defend the status quo.  Describing a progressive but not radical vision of social equality, 
Ryan describes a society that would:   
“hold that all persons have a right to a reasonable share of material necessities, a 
right to do constructive work, and a right of unhindered access to education, to 
gratifying social memberships, to participation in the life and decisions of the 
community, and to all the major amenities of society.  This principle doesn’t lend 
itself to the calculation of ‘equal results,’ and it certainly doesn’t imply a demand 
for uniformity of resources.  No one in his right mind would entertain some 
cockeyed scheme in which everyone went to school for precisely thirteen years, 
consumed each year 19,800 grams of protein and 820,000 calories…” (p. 29).   
Invoking the notion of absolute equality misleads the debate from the true issues of what 
can be done within the confines of a capitalist economy and democratic government to 
reduce inequality.  Verba et al. (1987) note that adherence to the value of differential 
reward for differential success does not preclude questioning the degree of differential 
reward.  They write: “That some income difference is justified by both efficiency and 
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desert does not imply the degree of that difference” (p. 118).  Forced redistribution of 
resources to the point of outright equality is not the only solution to the gross inequalities 
that characterize US society.  There is an expansive middle ground between the extremes 
of laissez-faire capitalism and communism.  Examination of the systemic causes of 
inequality suggests practical strategies for controlling it within the confines of a capitalist 
democracy.   
Causes and Solutions for Inequality     
A report by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities and the Economic Policy 
Institute (2002) that analyzed state trends in economic inequality describes a number of 
factors contributing to growing inequality.  Focusing on wage inequality, the report cites: 
1) the shift from manufacturing to service sector jobs, which are on average lower 
paying, 2) globalization which brings domestic labor into competition with less 
expensive foreign labor, 3) the decline in the value of the minimum wage which, despite 
occasional federally legislated increases in the early 90s, has decreased in real value by 
18% since 1979, and 4) decreases in union membership (CBPP & EPI, 2002).  Union 
membership which is reliably tied to higher wages and benefits, stood at 12.9% of all 
wage and salary workers in 2003, down from 20.1% in 1983 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2004).   
Another factor contributing to the growing inequality in the United States is the 
failure to implement public policies strong enough to counteract growing inequality.  
According to the American Political Science Association’s Taskforce on Inequality and 
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American Democracy, “policies pursued – or not pursued – help to explain sharper 
socioeconomic disparities in the US compared to more muted inequalities in Canada, 
Germany, France, and other advance industrialized countries” (2004, p. 4; see also 
Alesina & Glaeser, 2004).  Policy strategies for decreasing inequality include the 
minimum wage (as of 2002 eleven states and the District of Columbia had raised their 
state minimum wages higher than the federal level, and as of 2006 18 states had done so), 
progressive state and federal income tax structures, and state and federal assistance to 
poor unemployed and working families (CBPP & EPI, 2002).  Specific forms of public 
assistance to needy families include the Earned Income Tax Credit, unemployment 
insurance, welfare, job training, childcare, Medicaid, low-income housing, and food 
stamps (Reich, 2004).  Additionally, affirmative action policies serve a key role in 
mitigating group-based inequality.  
Although effects of these strategies on inequality and on individuals is debatable 
(DeParle, 2004), and there is great variation in the specific practical aspects of 
implementation for any one of these strategies, the present study will not address the 
issue of how to best reduce inequality.  This study assumes simply that there are effective 
public strategies for reducing inequality -- the specific strategies for how to do so at the 
local, state, and federal governmental levels are addressed elsewhere.  This study 
examines support for a more general outcome, the belief that the government should do 
something to reduce inequality.  Opposition to government action to reduce inequality 
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will be interpreted as justification of the unequal status quo, and support for government 
action to reduce inequality will be interpreted as rejection of the unequal status quo.   
Two key constructs will be examined as predictors of government action to 
reduce inequality: 1) moral judgments about how resources should be distributed which 
are referred to as distributive justice norms, and 2) beliefs about how resources are 
distributed which are called causal attributions.  In the introduction above, extreme 
versions of liberal and conservative views on inequality have been used to illustrate the 
full spectrum of attitudes.  This false dichotomization will persist below as I attempt to 
contrast supporters and opponents of government action to reduce inequality, in terms of 
preferred norms of distributive justice and causal attributions for each.  However, this 
dichotomization is only a convenient conceptual simplification.  This study will show 
that attitudes toward economic inequality in the US population are not so categorically 
and diametrically opposed as the liberal and conservative extremes would suggest.  There 
are important similarities between critics and supporters of the unequal status quo, such 
as dominant cultural values of personal responsibility and just deserts, but the pivotal 
difference is the extent to which structural factors are believed to contribute to the 
unequal distribution of resources in society.  Similarities and differences between 
supporters and opponents of government action to reduce inequality will be detailed 
below in the review of the literature for distributive justice norms and causal attributions.   
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Distributive Justice Norms 
The ideological debate on inequality is fueled not so much by disagreements 
about the objective aspects of inequality as by disputes concerning its moral dimensions.  
Questions about who should have what and how much equality there should be have a 
distinct moral component -- they are essentially questions of justice.  Philosophical and 
empirical work on justice will be reviewed in detail below, but I approach that content vis 
a vis the work on social justice in community psychology in order to advance the 
treatment of justice in the community psychology literature.   
 A concern for social justice is a defining feature of community psychology.  
According to Fondacaro and Weinberg (2002), “Perhaps more fundamentally than any 
other concept, the concept social justice pervades and informs strategies of research and 
intervention in the discipline” (p. 474).  Recalling the genesis of the field, Prilleltensky 
wrote:  
“Community psychology emerged in the sixties to address some of the 
shortcomings of clinical and traditional applied psychology (Rappaport, 1977; 
Sarason, 1988). …Community psychologists began to question the value of 
helping individuals when so many societal structures were inimical to human 
welfare.  This realization led to calls for social change.  As community 
psychologists, pioneers in our field wanted to use their skills to improve not just 
the well being of individuals but of society as a whole.  There was the promise of 
social change and the expectation that community psychologists would become 
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allies with oppressed groups in the struggle for social justice (Prilleltensky & 
Nelson, 1997)” (2001, p.749). 
But what exactly is social justice?  Authors within the field of community 
psychology continuously endorse the ideal of social justice, with very little specific 
definition of the term or description of what socially just research or behavior on the part 
of individuals or societies would look like.  Arguing for an empirical treatment of social 
justice, Fondacaro and Weinberg (2002) note that authors “continue to treat the meaning 
of this value as if it was somehow given and unambiguous” (p. 486).  Even conservative 
commentators have noted the popularity and simultaneous obscurity of the term.  For 
example, a commentator for the American Enterprise Institute observed that “social 
justice is all the rage,” labeling it “P.C. groupthink” because no one will offer a clear 
definition of what it means (Pike, 2003).  
Prilleltensky (2001) defined social justice as, “fair and equitable allocation of 
bargaining powers, resources, and obligations in society in consideration of people’s 
differential power, needs, and abilities to express their wishes” (p. 754).  Bell (1997) 
defined social justice as, “full and equal participation of all groups in a society that is 
mutually shaped to meet their needs.  Social justice includes a vision of society in which 
the distribution of resources is equitable and all members are physically and 
psychologically safe and secure” (p. 3).  However, fairness and equitability are not 
unambiguous terms themselves, so a deeper examination of these definitions is needed.  
Two conceptual distinctions are useful in considering the definition of social justice:  1) 
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distributive and procedural versions of justice, and 2) justice norms including equity and 
equality.  
 Both definitions of social justice presented above address the distribution of 
desired resources across the members of a society, which is an issue of distributive 
justice.  Prilleltensky (1997), recognizing the obvious importance of material resources, 
asserted that psychologists must attend to distributive justice in order to avoid 
individualizing psychological distress.  Raising the bar a little higher, Young (1990; as 
cited in Mullaly, 2002) noted that studies of justice in psychology have tended to focus 
on questions of the distribution of resources.  Young argues that social justice cannot be 
attained purely by distributive remedies—that changes in the processes that lead to unjust 
distributions are also necessary.  Another type of justice, procedural justice (Leventhal, 
1976; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), addresses judgments of justice in processes, for 
example, dispute settlement, deliberation of criminal cases, or group decision making.  
Empowerment as conceptualized by community psychologists (Rappaport, 1987; 
Zimmerman, 2000) is a mainstay of procedural justice.  Through the process of 
empowerment, disempowered individuals exert voice and self-determination.  On the 
other hand, Riger (1993), speaking of empowerment as an outcome, argued that the 
heightened sense of efficacy and perceived control resulting from participatory processes 
should not be substituted for real redistribution of power.  Indeed, empirical studies have 
demonstrated that participation in decision making processes is strongly related to 
perceptions of fairness, and that perceived fairness in turn predicts satisfaction with 
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outcomes (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Walker, Lind, & Thibaut, 1979), even when 
participation does not amount to real control of outcomes (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 
1985).   
 Both distributive and procedural versions of justice are based on the much more 
conflicted concepts of equity and equality.  Webster’s definition of the term equity is “the 
quality of being fair or impartial” (Costello, 1996).  But what is fair?  Homans (1961) 
likened equity to proportionality, the expectation that rewards will be proportional to 
investments.  Familiar concepts such as deservingness, earning, and merit are driven by 
the principle of equity.  Concepts of equity extend back to Aristotle (Walster & Walster, 
1975) suggesting that judgments about equity are essential to human nature.  However, 
Sampson (1975) noted that equity is not human nature but culturally derived:  “By nature 
man is not an equity theorist” (p. 49).   And there is evidence to suggest that the 
importance of equity varies between people and cultures.  Research on belief in a just 
world (Lerner, 1980) has demonstrated that many Americans have a particularly strong 
psychological need to believe that the world functions equitably—that people generally 
get what they deserve (for a review, see Furnham, 2003).  Della Fave (1986) 
demonstrated that in the US the principle of equity is integral to the psychological 
process of legitimating social inequality.   
Proportionality is a fairly straightforward concept when one considers known 
quantities of an agreed upon value, but determining the value of inputs and outcomes is 
highly contestable.  What is the value of an hour of work?  Is it even plausible that the 
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value of one person’s work should be anywhere near 88.5 times more than another 
person?  As Walster and Walster (1975) point out, “society can define anything—bravery 
or cowardice, humility or arrogance, beauty or ugliness—as a valuable input” (p. 29).  In 
US culture, the primary means for determining the value of any input or outcome is the 
market.  Almost everything has a monetary market value, supposedly determined by 
supply and demand.  Assuming the existence of the free-market, equal opportunity, and 
self-determination, the dominant view in US culture is that the market is just.  But this is 
an overly simplistic view in light of such current controversies as the question of whether 
the value we place on childhood education is accurately reflected in teacher salaries, or 
whether everyone or only those who can afford it have a right to health care.  It also 
completely fails to account for the possibility that rewards are not always equitably based 
on input or merit as envisioned, but inequitably on other factors such as gender, race, 
physique, or legacy.   From this perspective, equity as an abstract concept of 
proportionality is straightforward, but the process of defining the value of inputs and 
outputs is extremely subjective. 
 People also make justice claims based on criteria other than equity, such as 
equality and need (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976; Sampson, 1975; Scott, Matland, 
Michelbach, & Bornstein, 2001).  Equality is less difficult to define than equity.  In the 
Webster’s dictionary equality is defined as, “as great as; like or alike in quantity, degree, 
or value” (Costello, 1996).  The difficulty with equality comes in deciding what should 
be alike in quantity.   We have seen earlier that equality is a loathsome concept in some 
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schools of thought in the US.  Novak (1995) states plainly: “It [equality] is wicked. It 
foments envy and destruction.”  What Novak finds so objectionable is the notion of 
equality of outcome, which is commonly rejected by Americans because it conflicts 
directly with the principle of equity.  How could equal outcomes be justified if some 
people try harder, have more ingenuity, are more talented, than others?  The more 
popular equality in the US is equality of opportunity (Verba & Orren, 1985; Kluegel & 
Smith, 1986).  Equality in this case is in the opportunity to pursue one’s interests to the 
best of one’s ability.  Although it shares the word equality, equality of opportunity 
actually has much more to do with equity than with equality of outcome.  Equal 
opportunity, as a distributive justice norm, that is, a moral assertion that all people should 
have equal opportunities, is really just the same as saying that people should have a 
chance to be rewarded for their efforts (equity).  So as a distributive justice norm, equal 
opportunity is practically synonymous with equity.  But it is essential to differentiate 
equal opportunity as a distributive justice norm, from the belief that equal opportunity 
actually exists as an objective condition in reality.   
 Psychological Research on Distributive Justice Norms 
Early research on distributive just norms utilized social dilemma experiments in 
which participants were placed in small groups, characteristics of the group such as 
composition or cohesiveness could be manipulated, and group members were asked to 
allocate scarce resources to themselves and other group members.  Findings from this 
line of research demonstrate that preferences for equity and equality in allocations vary 
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between and within persons in relation to many factors.  Females tend to prefer equality 
more than males (Bond & Vinacke, 1961; Leventhal & Lane, 1970).  When group 
members’ relative status in the group was manipulated, lower status individuals were 
more likely to make allocations based on need (d’Anjou, Steijn, & Van Aarsen, 1995) or 
equality (Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan, & Levanon, 2003; Ritzman & Tomaskovic-Devey, 
1992; Shepelak, 1987).  When group identity was heightened, allocations were more 
egalitarian (Dawes, Van de Kragt, & Orbell,1988).  Finally, an individual’s wealth 
increased egalitarian allocations when inequality in the wealth of group members was 
low, but when inequality was high, self-interest was higher (Komorita & Parks, 1994).  
Ironically, the more inequality there was in the group the less likely wealthy parties were 
to share.  [For reviews see Komorita & Parks (1994), Sampson, (1975), and Walster & 
Walster, (1975).]   
Later studies measuring equity and equality as personal values have focused on 
relative preference for these values as an individual difference variable.  The importance 
of values as predictors of behaviors has been widely discussed by numerous authors 
(Allport, 1954; Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Prilleltensky, 2001; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
1994).  Values are defined by Shwartz as goals “that serve as guiding principles in the 
life of a person or other social entity” (1994, p. 21) and by Rokeach as “an enduring 
belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially 
preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence” (1973, 
p. 5).  Rokeach proposed that political ideologies could be classified along two 
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orthogonal dimensions, freedom and equality.  Using content analysis of representative 
political writings, Rokeach reliably differentiated between communist, socialist, 
capitalist, and fascist texts by tallying the relative frequencies of equality and freedom 
themes.  Although factor analytic studies have not supported this two-factor structure of 
values, equality has consistently been found to be a more powerful predictor of political 
ideology than freedom (Braithwaite, 1994).  Supporters of left-leaning political parties 
and policies consistently place greater emphasis on equality (Sidanius, 1990).   
The value of equality also figures prominently in research on social dominance 
orientation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle (1994) 
define SDO as “one’s degree of preference for inequality among social groups” (p. 741).  
The authors present a 14-item measure of attitudes towards equality and inequality that 
produced a single internally consistent scale along with evidence for convergent and 
discriminant validity.  Findings included that males were higher in SDO, and participants 
higher in SDO were more likely to pursue “hierarchy enhancing” careers such as 
business and law whereas persons in “hierarchy attenuating” careers like social work or 
counseling were lower in SDO.  SDO was positively associated with the belief in equal 
opportunity and conservative political identity, and negatively associated with support for 
egalitarian policies like gay rights, women’s rights, welfare, and affirmative action.   
Additionally, participants high in SDO were less likely to endorse the idea that persons 
with more resources should share them with persons with less.   
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There is also evidence that although they seem logically incompatible some 
people actually hold a mixture of equity and equality distributive justice norms.  Rasinski 
(1987) examined personal values of egalitarianism (equality) and proportionality (equity) 
as predictors of fairness judgments of processes and distribution of government benefits 
and college scholarships. Rasinski provided tentative support for a two-factor 
equity/equality values measure and found that these two factors were moderately 
negatively associated (r = -.58).  Notably equity and equality formed separate scales 
indicating that they are not mutually exclusive, though they were inversely related.  
Similar to earlier studies, men and conservatives were significantly more equity oriented.  
The study also demonstrated that persons who valued equity more than equality tended to 
emphasize procedural justice in their judgments of government fairness, whereas 
participants favoring egalitarianism based judgments of government fairness on 
procedural and distributive justice.  In other words, participants favoring equity based 
overall fairness judgments primarily on their view of the fairness of the process by which 
resources were distributed, whereas participants favoring equality based overall fairness 
judgments on both the process and the outcome of the distribution of resources.  These 
findings suggest that persons endorsing equality are also concerned with equity 
(procedural fairness), they just don’t assume that fair processes necessarily result in fair 
outcomes.   
One problem with Rasinski’s study is that the measure of proportionality was 
actually a combination of items measuring equity and individual attributions.  An initial 
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factor model with separate factors for equity and individual attributions was rejected 
because individual attribution style was too highly correlated with equity.  This 
correlation was likely due to the fact that the individual attributions scale concerned 
attributions about the state of “poor people” at the same time that the equity measure 
used items explicitly dealing with “welfare”.  Rasinski’s proportionality measure also 
does not differentiate between equity as a distributive justice norm (i.e., an ideal for how 
resources should be distributed) and equity as an observation of how fairly resources are 
distributed in society.  For example the proportionality measure contains one item 
dealing with equity as an ideal (e.g., “Anybody receiving welfare in this country should 
be made to work for the money they get”) and the observation of equity in reality (e.g., 
“All things considered, most people get just what they deserve out of life”), the latter of 
which is similar to belief in a just world (Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Lerner, 1980).  Scales 
measuring belief in a just world (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) are often described as measures 
of proportionality as a justice norm (e.g., Nosworthy, Lea, & Lindsay, 1995), but it is 
important to distinguish between the belief that valued resources should be distributed 
proportionally, and beliefs about how proportionally resources actually are distributed.  
Just World scales appear to measure the latter, whereas scales such as the Belief in Merit 
Scale (Davey, Bobocel, Son Hing, & Zanna, 1999) tap the belief that proportionality is a 
desirable ideal for distributions of rewards.  As shown below, there is literature to suggest 
that perceptions of how resources are distributed affect individuals’ views about how 
resources should be distributed. 
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The literature on distributive justice norms suggests that the endorsement of 
equality of outcome as a distributive justice norm is an important individual difference 
variable which can be expected to predict support for redistributing wealth from those 
who have more to those who have less (i.e., reducing economic inequality).  However 
there is also evidence that persons endorsing equality of outcome are also concerned 
about equity.  If equality of outcome violates the equity distributive justice norm, why 
would some people endorse equality of outcome while still valuing equity?  The studies 
reviewed below suggest that affinity for equality of outcome depends upon one’s analysis 
of how fairly resources are being distributed.  If resources are not judged to have been 
distributed fairly in the first place then equality of outcome becomes more acceptable. 
In one group of studies (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993; Mitchell, 
Tetlock, Newman, & Lerner, 2001; Scott, Matland, Michelbach, & Bornstein, 2001) 
participants were asked to judge the fairness of a range of income distributions for a 
hypothetical society, which varied in terms of equality and overall prosperity, while the 
perceived level of proportionality that exists in the society was manipulated (i.e., the 
degree to which income is based on merit).  Again, although individuals generally held a 
mixture of competing distributive justice norms, politically liberal participants, women, 
and participants with low SES were generally more likely to prefer egalitarian 
distributions.  These studies have also shown that one’s understanding of how resources 
are distributed is a determining factor in distributive justice preferences.  Specifically, as 
the perceived meritocracy of the society increased (i.e., participants believe income is 
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based on ability) preferences for equality decreased for all participants. In other words, 
belief in a level playing field decreases preferences for equality (Mitchell et al., 2001).  
This finding suggests that the perception of how fairly resources have been distributed in 
the first place is an essential determinant of endorsement of distributive justice norms.  
A similar finding concerning equity was produced by Bobocel et al. (1998) in a 
study examining attitudes towards affirmative action.  The authors found a marginally 
significant moderating effect of perception of discrimination in the workplace on the 
negative relationship between equity values and support for affirmative action.  The 
negative effect of equity values on affirmative action support only occurred for people 
who believed there was little discrimination in the workplace.  In this study, the belief 
that equal opportunity exists determined the relationship between the equity distributive 
justice norm and support for affirmative action.  That is, equity was more likely to be 
used as a reason for opposition to affirmative action when participants believed that there 
was equal opportunity in the workplace.  This finding suggests that the perception that 
resources have been distributed fairly, beyond influencing the level of endorsement of 
distributive justice norms, also can influence the relationship of the norms to support for 
policies to reduce inequality.   
The literature on distributive justice norms provides evidence that equity and 
equality will be related to support for policies to reduce inequality.  There is also reason 
to believe that interpersonal differences in commitment to either equality or equity may 
be explained by one’s analysis of how fairly resources are being distributed.  That is, 
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views about how resources should be distributed are dependent on views about how 
resources are distributed.  The studies reviewed above suggest that the assessment of 
how fairly resources have been distributed is essentially an assessment of the extent to 
which economic outcomes are solely determined by individual merit.  If structural factors 
play a role, for example if some people enjoy greater opportunity due to a privileged 
upbringing, or less opportunity because of discrimination, then resources have not been 
distributed fairly, and equality of outcome should become a more desirable distributive 
justice norm, despite prevailing preferences for equity. The relationship between the 
distributive justice norms and support for policies to reduce inequality may also be 
dependent on one’s analysis of how fairly resources are being distributed.  Equity may be 
more strongly related to opposition to reducing inequality when respondents believe that 
resources have been distributed fairly.  In the remainder of this literature review, I 
examine individual perceptions regarding how fairly resources are distributed in greater 
detail, focusing on causal attributions made about how resources are distributed in 
society.  Individuals may believe that poverty and wealth are attributable solely to 
characteristics of the individual, or they may also believe that external factors such as 
discrimination and privilege determine poverty and wealth.  In this study, attributions of 
poverty and wealth to factors external to the individual will be referred to as systems 
analysis. 
22 
Causal Attributions and Systems Analysis 
The idea of personal responsibility is a dominant cultural value in the US.  Bellah 
et al. (1985) wrote that “we are united, as it turns out, in at least one core belief, even 
across lines of color, religion, region and occupation:  the belief that economic success or 
misfortune is the individual’s responsibility, and his or hers alone” (p. viii).  The idea that 
people are primarily responsible for their own success, and that anyone can succeed by 
just pulling themselves up by their bootstraps is widespread.  Hinderaker and Johnson 
(1996) maintain that “for the most part, upper-income American families do better than 
lower-income families because they toil harder.”  A recent article in The Economist refers 
to a Brookings Institution report which finds that “if all the heads of poor households 
who are neither elderly nor disabled had graduated from high school, worked full time, 
married before they had children and then had no more than two children per family, the 
poverty rate in America would be 3.7%” (“Poor prospects”, 2004).  In this formula, 
success results in rather straightforward fashion when individuals make responsible 
decisions; individuals have only to make those decisions.  The idea of self-reliance can 
be decomposed into a moral component, which is the degree to which one feels that 
people are primarily responsible for themselves or for each other, and a cognitive 
component—an individualistic causal attribution style. 
Causal attributions.  Experimentation in social psychology has demonstrated the 
tendency of Americans to attribute individuals’ behaviors to dispositions rather than 
situations, a tendency known as the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977).  
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According to Daniel Gilbert, “in study after study, observers claim that others ‘are the 
way they act,’ and they make such claims even when compelling circumstances can 
explain the observed behavior quite adequately,” calling this “one of the most reliable 
and robust findings in the annals of attribution research” (1995, p. 106).  A prime 
example of the fundamental attribution error is the phenomenon of “blaming the victim” 
that William Ryan (1971) described, whereby persons who are oppressed actually come 
to be blamed for their oppression, for example blaming a rape victim for being raped.  
Such a tendency towards individual attributions for behavior has been repeatedly 
demonstrated in previous research on attitudes toward economic inequality.   
In a large sample public opinion survey in 1945, US residents were asked, “Why 
are some people always poor?”  Findings indicated that explanations tended towards 
individual attributions such as lack of effort, money mismanagement, and character 
deficits (Allen, 1970).  Thirty years later, Feagin (1975) classified lay attributions of 
poverty into three empirical categories: individualistic (deficits of poor people), structural 
(deficits of society and economic systems), and fatalistic (bad luck or fate), and found a 
similar tendency towards individualistic attributions of poverty.  Furnham (1999) reports 
that a number of subsequent factor analytic studies have consistently supported Feagin’s 
three-category classification.  In Feagin’s study, structural attributions for poverty 
included macro-economic factors such as low wages and job shortages, failure of 
government to provide education equally to all segments of the population, and racial 
discrimination.   
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International comparisons reveal that Americans are distinctly more likely to 
make individualist attributions of poverty than persons in other countries.  Recent 
research by Alesina and Glaeser (2004) using data from the World Values Survey for the 
years 1983 to 1997 found that 60% of Americans believe that poor people are lazy 
compared to 26% of respondents from the European Union, and 29% of Americans 
believe that the poor “are trapped in poverty” compared to 60% of Europeans (p. 184).  
Within US culture, White males of middle to high SES have been consistently shown to 
prefer individualistic attributions of poverty (Bobo, 1991; Cozarelli, Wilkinson, & 
Tagler, 2001;  Feagin, 1975; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lee, Jones, & Lewis, 1990).   
As one might expect, the types of attributions a person makes about poverty are 
related to the types of solutions they see as appropriate.   Individuals who attribute 
poverty to individual deficits have more negative views of redistributive policies such as 
welfare. (Feagin, 1975; Lee, Jones, & Lewis, 1990).  Kluegel and Smith (1986) found 
that individual and structural attributions for poverty were independent constructs, and 
that structural attributions for poverty were more powerful predictors of attitudes toward 
social policy than individual attributions.  Similarly, Bobo (1991) found that individuals 
who gave higher priority to structural attributions for inequality than individual 
attributions were significantly more supportive of policies designed to reduce racial and 
economic inequality, and this effect was particularly strong for Whites.  These findings 
give reason to expect that people who make structural attributions for poverty will more 
strongly support policies to reduce inequality. 
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The association between attribution style and racial group membership may be 
explained by the relationship between the race of the poor person and the race of the 
person making the attributions.  Iyengar (1990) examined White middle class 
individuals’ attributions of poverty in response to mock video news coverage of poor 
people.  Iyengar manipulated the race and gender of the poor person and found that 
respondents were more likely to assess causal responsibility and treatment responsibility 
(recommended solution) to individual rather than societal causes when the poor person 
was Black and female.  Iyengar noted that ironically the persons most likely to be poor 
were also the most likely to be blamed for being poor and held responsible for getting 
themselves out of poverty.  Earlier studies of attribution that accounted for the 
relationship between the race of the participant and the target found that dominant group 
members are more likely to make internal attributions of desirable behaviors of in-group 
members and of undesirable behaviors of out-group members (Pettigrew, 1979; 
Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Hunter, Stringer, & Watson, 1991; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974).  In 
similar fashion, intergroup bias is negatively related to support for public efforts to 
reduce poverty and inequality.  Alesina and Glaeser (2004) presented cross-national data 
that reveal that the level of racial diversity in a nation is strongly negatively associated 
with the level of social welfare spending in a country.  These authors cite a similar 
pattern among US states.  For example, amounts of 1990 AFDC payments ranged from a 
high of $800 per month in mostly White Alaska, to a low of $150 in Mississippi and 
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Alabama [1st and 5th respectively, among states in terms of proportion of African 
American population in 1990 (US Census Bureau, 2001)].   
In addition to causal attributions about poverty, individuals also make attributions 
about prosperity.  The dominant cultural ideology idealizes the self-made man who 
succeeds by virtue of his own merits.  For example, Kluegel and Smith (1986) examined 
lay explanations for why “there are rich people in the US” and found that individuals 
were more likely to attribute wealth to individual factors such as personal drive, 
willingness to take risks, hard work, and initiative.  An alternative perspective on 
financial success recognizes the variety of external factors that contribute to individual 
wealth.  The non-profit organization United for a Fair Economy (2004) recently produced 
a report examining wealth attributions in semi-structured interviews with 12 wealthy 
individuals including Warren Buffett, the second wealthiest person in the world.  Among 
the external factors identified as contributing to personal success were luck and timing, 
colleagues and coworkers, parental support, inheritance, skin color and appearance, 
public infrastructure such as roads and communication systems, and public and private 
investment in new technologies. 
Structural attributions for wealth are at the center of the acknowledgement of 
privilege concept, which is a recently developing area of research in the multicultural 
counseling psychology field.  Work in this area examines the acknowledgement of 
privilege by privileged persons, focusing primarily on privilege obtained from 
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membership in dominant gender and racial groups, but other groups as well such as 
sexual orientation and class.   
In developing her model of White racial identity development Helms (1984) 
asserted that the major developmental issue for Whites in the development of a healthy 
White racial identity is the abandonment of White privilege (1995).  Describing 
acknowledgment of privilege precisely as a departure from the dominant US cultural 
ideology, McIntosh (1989) writes,  
“obliviousness about White advantage, like obliviousness about male advantage, 
is kept strongly inculturated [sic] in the United States so as to maintain the myth 
of meritocracy, the myth that democratic choice is equally available to all.  
Keeping most people unaware the freedom of confident action is there for just a 
small number of people props up those in power, and serves to keep power in the 
hands of the same groups that have most of it already” (p. 12). 
McIntosh (1988) developed a list of the privileges of White racial group membership 
based on her own life experiences that is one of the few detailed descriptions of racial 
privilege in the literature.  Items from her list include: “”Whether I use checks, credit 
cards, or cash, I can count on my skin color not to work against the appearance that I am 
financially reliable,” and “I can be pretty sure of finding people who would be willing to 
talk with me and advise me about my next steps, professionally” (p. 98).  Further 
describing the nature of privilege, Lazos Vargas (1998) writes: 
28 
“White privilege means having entry to structures and institutions that mete out 
important economic opportunities, having access to neighborhoods, jobs, credit, 
and tax benefits that by and large are off limits or available in limited fashion to 
minorities; it means being presumed competent, intelligent, and hardworking; it 
means not being discriminated against daily by anyone ranging from a restaurant 
attendant to a car salesperson” (p. 1527). 
Although there are numerous conceptual descriptions of privilege, empirical 
studies on the topic are limited.  Ancis and Szymanski (2001) used qualitative analysis to 
examine White counseling trainees reactions to McIntosh’s (1988) list.  They found 
participants’ reactions clustered into three themes: 1) lack of awareness and denial of 
White privilege, 2) awareness of White privilege and discrimination, and 3) higher order 
awareness of privilege and action.   In another study, Pinterits (2004) associated high 
scores on an original scale of White privilege acknowledgment with lower scores on 
Sidanius and Pratto’s (1999) measure of social dominance orientation and McConahay’s 
(1986) Modern Racism Scale.   
Acknowledgement of White racial privilege is a component of the Color-Blind 
Racial Attitudes scale (CoBRAs; Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Brown, 2000) that 
assesses the idea that race should not and does not matter.  CoBRAs theory developed 
from McConahay’s (1986) work on Modern Racism that was based on the idea that as 
racism has become less acceptable in the cultural mainstream racist attitudes have taken 
on a more subtle and covert cast.  CoBRAs theorists suggest that denial that racism 
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exists, or color-blindness, is one of the more recently developing and publicly acceptable 
manifestations of modern racism.  The CoBRAs measure developed by Neville et al. 
produced three-factors, the first of which was an acknowledgement of White privilege 
scale that showed strong evidence for reliability, and convergent, discriminant, and 
criterion-related validity.  This scale measures acknowledgement of racial privileges in 
obtaining financial success, criminal justice, social services, and general opportunity.   
Systems analysis.  In the present study I propose that the tendency to make 
structural attributions for poverty and wealth is part of an underlying competence for 
understanding a wider sphere of causality beyond the relatively simple view that 
individual’s determine their outcomes through their own intentionality.  Both structural 
attributions of poverty and prosperity entail the ability to recognize the structural, 
environmental, and contextual factors that contribute to behavior in addition to individual 
qualities of character.  This competence, which will be referred to as systems analysis, 
represents the shift from a focus on individual units of behavior to a focus on other 
sources of causality such as the independent effects of combinations and networks of 
behavior, the effects of non-individual actors such as organizations and institutions, and 
the limiting effects of systems such as organizational rules and societal norms that govern 
behavior to a certain extent.  This shift to higher-level units of conceptualization is 
exemplified in the emergence of ecology from biology (Capra, 2002), of sociology from 
social work (Martin, 2003), and of community psychology from clinical psychology 
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(Kelly, Ryan, Altman, & Stelzner, 2000).  The same broadening of causal understanding 
also figures prominently in work on critical consciousness.   
Introducing the idea of critical consciousness, Freire (1970) described a process 
through which oppressed persons discover the larger social forces that determine their 
oppression.  Freire writes that “the pedagogy of the oppressed… makes oppression and 
its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come the 
necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation” (p. 48).  Serrano-Garcia (1994), 
after identifying that asymmetrical distributions of material resources determine power in 
dominant/subordinate relationships, pointed out that consciousness of asymmetry also 
determines power.  She defined consciousness as “the individual or collective grasp of 
prevailing ideologies” (p. 10) and cited the Spanish-language work of Ander-Egg (1980) 
who specified four stages of consciousness: submissive, precritical, critical-integrative, 
and liberating.  In the precritical stage, people “begin to search for explanations and to 
make causal attributions,” and at the critical-integrative stage they “begin to analyze the 
social and historical roots of asymmetry and initiate change efforts” (p. 11).  Similarly, 
Watts, Williams, and Jagers (2003) proposed a model of sociopolitical development in 
which persons begin “to look beyond facile explanations for events … injustice begins to 
be understood in historical context, and as sociopolitical development proceeds, the 
developing individual acquires a more systemic perspective on his or her life 
circumstances and current events” (p. 188).    
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Although theoretical and empirical developments on the topic of critical 
consciousness raising are not sufficiently advanced to describe the specific components 
of systems analysis, it is clear that the broadening of causal understanding characteristic 
of critical consciousness includes broadening of both spatial and temporal perspectives.  
The causes for any individual outcome are rooted in: 1) the spatial context of the 
individual, which includes a variety of higher-level structural aspects such as social 
relations, group dynamics, environmental qualities, cultural norms, institutional practices, 
and societal characteristics as well, and 2) the temporal context of the individual which 
consists of the web of historical events preceding an individual’s actions which are 
inevitably a factor in determining what actions happen next.  Fletcher et al. (1986) make 
a similar distinction in a study of “attributional complexity.”  They describe two varieties 
of external causal attributions—a spatial dimension which “may be seen as radiating out 
spatially and contemporaneously from the person” and another temporal dimension that 
exerts “influence from the distant past, perhaps through chains of intermediary causes” 
(p. 877).  A measure of attributional complexity developed for that study included items 
for both dimensions of external attribution, and results indicated that the scale was 
unidimensional.   
Systems analysis entails a broader understanding of an event than just the 
immediate qualities that are located spatially within the actors in the event, and 
temporally at the present time of the event.  In the case of economic outcomes, an event 
like poverty is understood to be caused by both qualities of the poor themselves, but also 
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by: 1) qualities of the spatial context in which the poverty occurs --characteristics of the 
person’s environment, family, school, job market, housing market – the full range of 
characteristics of society that affect how financially successful one is in society, as well 
as 2) the temporal context in which the poverty occurs – what is the poor person’s 
history, how have their previous conditions influenced their present condition, and how 
will their present condition influence their future?  The definition of systems analysis can 
be elaborated much more completely depending upon the specific phenomenon to be 
analyzed.  However, a detailed definition of systems analysis exceeds the purposes of the 
present study, given that the most rudimentary structural attributions tend to be 
deviations from the common American ethic of personal responsibility (individual 
attributions) and will likely meaningfully differentiate people in the sample.  Systems 
analysis will be represented by the tendency to make structural attributions for both 
poverty and wealth.  Systems analysis will be interpreted as a belief that resources have 
not been distributed fairly, because outcomes are not determined solely on the basis of 
individual merit.   
As in previous studies (Feagin, 1975; Kluegel & Smith, 1986) systems analysis is 
expected to be a separate construct weakly correlated with individual attributions, 
reflecting that for many people structural attributions accompany individual attributions 
for behavior.  Individual attributions, reflecting the dominant cultural value of personal 
responsibility, are expected to be commonly endorsed by participants.  As with the equity 
distributive justice norm, because they are expected to be popular throughout the sample 
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individual attributions are expected to be weakly associated with support for government 
action to reduce inequality, but more strongly predictive of opposition to government 
action to reduce inequality when systems analysis is low.  Such a finding would indicate 
that individual attributions, like equity, are endorsed by both opponents and supporters of 
reducing inequality, but when people have the associated belief that resources are 
distributed fairly (low systems analysis) individual attributions will be used as 
justification for opposition to reductions in inequality.   
 Underlying motives for causal attributions.  Although they are obviously essential 
to beliefs about inequality, individuals’ analysis of the causes of economic outcomes may 
not be as simple as cool-headed rational assessments of reality.  As previously reviewed, 
a number of studies demonstrate that group membership affects the type of attributions 
people make for success and failure.  For example, a number of studies indicate that 
White males tend to prefer individual attributions for poverty (Bobo, 1991; Cozarelli, 
Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001;  Feagin, 1975; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lee, Jones, & Lewis, 
1990).  Other studies directly accounting for the interrelationship between the group 
membership of both the person making the attributions and the target of the attributions 
have shown that participants are more likely to make individual attributions for desirable 
behaviors of in-group and undesirable behaviors of outgroup members (Pettigrew, 1979; 
Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Hunter, Stringer, & Watson, 1991; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974).  
While these studies have constructed group membership in experimental settings, Iyengar 
(1990) has produced similar findings for the specific case of racial group membership.  
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Such findings suggest that the type of analysis of economic outcomes that one commits is 
not driven solely by one’s observation of reality but also by more powerful visceral 
influences such as intergroup bias.   
Relatedly, research on belief in a just world has shown that the psychological 
discomfort that results from certain observations of reality, such as the perception of 
injustice, creates so much cognitive dissonance that people actually reshape their view of 
reality for their own peace of mind (Lerner, 1980).  Kluegel and Smith (1986) directly 
assessed the belief that equal opportunity exists using items that asked participants to 
compare the opportunity of the wealthy, Blacks, women, and the working class.  They 
found that there was much less acknowledgement that Blacks, minorities, and the 
working class had less opportunity than that the wealthy had more. This finding suggests 
that the process of attributing advantage to structural factors may be qualitatively 
different than the process of attributing disadvantage to structural factors.  The 
implications of the latter reflect more negatively on society, and therefore may be more 
psychologically uncomfortable than admitting that a few wealthy people might have 
benefited from some extra unearned advantages.   
One final reason that assessment of structural attributions and the belief that equal 
opportunity exists may not be as simple as requesting participants’ unbiased observations 
of reality is that both structural attributions and equal opportunity are closely related to 
associated moral values.  As with distributive justice norms, causal attributions have both 
an objective component and a moral component.  Individual attributions for economic 
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outcomes may be as likely to reflect participants’ observation of reality as their 
commitment to ethics of personal responsibility and self-reliance.  That is individual 
attributions may reflect the view that people should be personally responsible for their 
economic outcomes as much as the view that people actually are responsible for their 
poverty or wealth.  Similarly, participants’ assessment of the amount of equal opportunity 
that exists in society may reflect their commitment to equal opportunity as a distributive 
justice norm, described earlier, which is their belief that people should have equal 
opportunities rather than their observation of how much people really do have equal 
opportunities.  This ambiguity is a challenge to measurement of these constructs, which 
will be considered when evaluating the validity of causal attribution and equal 
opportunity measures in this study.   
Summary 
In review, predictors of support for government action to reduce inequality will 
be distributive justice norms equity and equality of outcome along with individual and 
structural causal attributions.  The distributive justice norms reflect views about how 
resources should be distributed, whereas causal attributions reflect individuals’ analysis 
of how fairly resources are distributed.  Systems analysis is represented by structural 
attributions for poverty and wealth, which reflect the belief that economic outcomes are 
not determined solely by individual merit.  If factors other than individual merit 
determine poverty and wealth, then it can be assumed that resources are not distributed 
fairly.   
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Systems analysis plays a central role in determining endorsement of distributive 
justice norms, support for efforts to reduce inequality, and the use of individual 
attributions as justifications for opposition to inequality.  Although equity is the preferred 
norm of distributive justice in the US, and equality of outcome is generally rejected 
because it conflicts directly with equity, systems analysis is expected to increase 
endorsement of equality of outcome because it implies that resources have not been 
distributed fairly in the first place.  Furthermore, although the equity distributive justice 
norm and individual attributions for poverty and wealth represent dominant cultural 
values in the US and so are expected to be commonly endorsed by most participants, 
their relationship to support for government action to reduce inequality is expected to be 
moderated by systems analysis.  Because they are popular, and generally invariant, they 
will be weakly or unrelated to policy support, but will be negatively related to policy 
support when systems analysis is low.  Therefore the common use of equity and 
individual attributions as justifications for opposition to policies to reduce inequality is 
driven by underlying beliefs about how fairly resources are distributed in the first place.  
Overall, systems analysis is conceptualized as the determining factor in attitudes toward 
inequality, driving both endorsement of distributive justice norms and their use as 
justifications for opposition to policies to reduce inequality.   
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Chapter Two: Introduction to the Present Study 
This paper will examine psychological attitudes towards economic inequality in 
the United States.  In the United States, the degree of income inequality is the largest 
among developed nations (EPI, 2004) and growing.  Empirical studies have shown that 
high levels of economic inequality are associated with higher mortality, and lower 
interpersonal trust, civic engagement, and political participation (American Political 
Science Association, 2004; Kawachi et al., 1997), even after controlling for the effects of 
poverty.  The distribution of society’s resources is a complex process that is multiply 
determined by a variety of macro-system factors such as the shift from manufacturing to 
service-sector jobs, off-shoring of jobs, the decline in the real-value of the minimum 
wage, decreased union membership, and the failure to implement public policies (e.g., 
minimum wage hikes, progressive taxation, and welfare) that mitigate the effects of 
growing inequality (Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, 2002).  The present study 
focuses on systems analysis, the extent to which one acknowledges that, in addition to 
individual qualities of character, factors external to the individual also determine 
economic outcomes, as a predictor of support for government action to reduce inequality.   
Attitudes toward inequality comprise a network of interdependent values and 
beliefs concerning how resources such as money and opportunity should be distributed in 
society, and how they actually are distributed.  Distributive justice norms of equity and 
equality of outcome represent moral commitments about how resources should be 
distributed.  Causal attributions for poverty and wealth represent individuals’ analysis of 
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how resources actually are distributed in society.  Systems analysis is the 
acknowledgement that not only individual factors but structural factors external to the 
individual also determine economic outcomes.  Systems analysis represents a specific 
case of critical consciousness applied to the problem of economic inequality.  This study 
will address the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: Equity and equality of outcome are not mutually exclusive – they 
will be measured by separate weakly correlated constructs; Hypothesis 2: Equity will be 
commonly endorsed by participants, whereas equality of outcome will be endorsed by 
few participants.  The dominant distributive justice norm in the US is equity (Walster & 
Walster, 1975), which is the belief that rewards should be distributed proportionally 
based on inputs.  Although equality is a prominent value in American culture, primarily it 
is equality of opportunity (Verba & Orren, 1985).  Equality of outcome is a much less 
popular ideal, so unpopular that calls for reductions in inequality are often confused with 
calls for outright equality of outcome (Ryan, 1981).  Previous studies have shown that 
equity and equality of outcome can be measured by separate constructs (Mitchell, 
Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993; Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman, & Lerner, 2001; 
Rasinski, 1987; Scott, Matland, Michelbach, & Bornstein, 2001), which, although they 
are negatively correlated, indicate that some people endorse both norms.  The reason for 
this logical conflict is found in the analysis of how fairly resources are distributed in the 
first place.  Although the sample is expected to be fairly homogeneous in terms of 
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distributive justice norms, people are expected to differ in how they analyze the causes of 
inequality. 
 Hypothesis 3: Individual and structural causal attributions will be weakly 
negatively correlated reflecting that they are not mutually exclusive attitudes; Hypothesis 
4: Structural attributions for poverty and wealth are expected to form a single systems 
analysis construct; Hypothesis 5: Systems analysis is expected to be a stronger predictor 
of support for redistribution than individual attributions, which will be commonly 
endorsed by respondents.  Causal attributions represent one aspect of individuals’ 
analysis of how resources are distributed.  The dominant cultural ideology in the US 
emphasizes the importance of personal responsibility which explains the American 
tendency towards individualistic causal attributions (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Feagin, 
1975).  Structural attributions represent the acknowledgement that individual qualities of 
character are not the sole determinants of economic outcomes, but that factors external to 
the individual also determine economic outcomes.  The tendency to make structural 
attributions is referred to as systems analysis.  Because systems analysis does not 
preclude the value of personal responsibility, individual attributions and systems analysis 
are expected to be measured by separate, weakly correlated constructs, reflecting again 
that many people make both individual and structural attributions for economic outcomes 
(Kluegel & Smith, 1986).  Because it is less common, systems analysis is expected to be 
a stronger predictor of support for government action to reduce inequality than individual 
attributions.   
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Hypothesis 6: Effects of equity and individual attributions on support for 
government redistribution will be moderated by systems analysis.  When systems analysis 
is low, equity and individual attributions will be strongly negatively related to support 
for redistribution.  In contrast, when systems analysis is high, equity and individual 
attributions will be unrelated to support for redistribution.  Structural attributions for 
poverty and wealth reflect the view that resources have not been distributed fairly.  For 
example, if one acknowledges that racial discrimination plays a role in determining who 
becomes poor, or that growing up in a wealthy family makes one more likely to be 
wealthy as an adult—both examples of structural attributions—the implication is that 
resources have not been distributed solely based on merit.  As such systems analysis 
represents the view that resources have not been distributed fairly.  People who believe 
that resources have not been distributed fairly should be more likely to endorse equality 
of outcome, despite prevailing preferences for equity.  Similarly, redistribution should be 
more justifiable among persons who believe that resources have not been distributed 
fairly.  Most importantly dominant cultural values like equity and individual attributions 
should only be negatively related to support for government action among persons who 
believe that resources have been distributed fairly.   
The primary purpose of this study is to explore the associations between the 
constructs I have reviewed, and to examine their effects on support for efforts to reduce 
economic inequality.  Specifically, this study aims to illustrate that opponents and 
supporters of reducing inequality share a common endorsement of dominant cultural 
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values like personal responsibility and just deserts.  However, supporters of inequality 
reduction differ from opponents in the extent to which they acknowledge that systemic 
factors, and not only individual qualities of character determine who is rich and who is 
poor.  These findings would ultimately be intended to clarify public discourse on 
economic inequality.  These findings would also suggest that an understanding of the 
structural determinants of resource distribution are the appropriate target for educational 
interventions that seek to inform people about causes and solutions to economic 
inequality.   
A secondary purpose, and a necessary step preceding the primary purpose, is to 
improve the conceptual and empirical clarity of constructs germane to attitudes toward 
inequality.  The first step of my analyses will be to confirm a measurement model based 
on the theoretical constructs that I have established in my review.  Conceptual 
organization of constructs is displayed in Figure 1.  Items from a survey administered as 
part of the International Social Justice Project will be used to assess the following 
constructs: 1) equity distributive justice norm, 2) equality distributive justice norm, 3) 
individual attributions, and 4) structural attributions.  Although individual and structural 
attributions might be conceptualized as opposite ends of a single continuum, previous 
studies have shown them to be sufficiently independent to warrant measuring them as 
separate constructs.  The same is true for the distributive justice norms, equity and 
equality.   It is hoped that by the inclusion of items representing all of these constructs 
42 
shown to be interrelated in the determination of attitudes toward inequality the true 
structure of these attitudes will emerge. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Organization of Predictors 
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Chapter Three: Method 
Data for this study are from the 1991 International Social Justice Project, an 
international collaborative research project that explored popular beliefs and attitudes on 
social, economic and political justice through two large-scale opinion surveys fielded in 
thirteen countries in 1991.  The participating countries were Russia, Estonia, Poland, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, East and West Germany, the United 
States, England, Holland, and Japan.   
Participants 
Only data for US respondents (n = 1414) were analyzed.  More than half (56%) 
were women and the large majority of the sample was White nonhispanic (86%).  
Additionally, 9% were Black nonhispanic, 3% were Hispanic, 1% were American 
Indian/Alaska Native, and .9% were Asian.  On an age variable with ordinal categories, 
the median was 36 to 45 years, 12% were younger than 26, and 15% were older than 65.   
In terms of education, 9% of the sample graduated from high school, 30% had additional 
vocational training, 32% were college graduates, 19% had master’s degrees, and 7% had 
doctoral degrees.  The average reported annual income was $43,700 (SD = $52,100).  
Self-reported social class was measured on a five-point scale ranging from lower to upper 
class on which 4% of respondents identified themselves as lower class, 28% as working 
class, 49% as middle class, 17% as upper middle class, and 2% as upper class.  Finally, a 
seven-point scale measuring political party identification (1=Strong Democrat / 7 = 
Strong Republican) indicated an even distribution with 44% of respondents selecting 
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some degree of Democratic affiliation, 45% some degree of Republican affiliation, and 
11% selecting the midpoint of the scale, ‘neither’.  Judging by the 1990 US Census 
(1990) this sample slightly overrepresents women (51%) and Whites (80%).    
Procedure 
The US survey for the ISJP used random sampling of US citizens aged 18 or older 
residing in telephone households in the continental US.  A two-stage process was used 
for selection of telephone numbers to ensure representativeness of the sample with regard 
geography and population density (Appendix A).  The response rate was 71.7% and the 
completion rate was 68.1%.  Interviews were conducted by 48 trained telephone 
interviewers of the Survey Research Center in the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Michigan.  Interviews lasted an average of 52 minutes.   
Measures 
The survey for the ISJP was developed by an international panel composed 
primarily of sociologists and some social psychologists with expertise on justice views.  
Survey development occurred over a series of meetings of collaborators from all thirteen 
participating countries at which relevant constructs and appropriate items were 
suggested, agreed upon, and pretested.  The final survey contained 100 items dealing 
with a broad range of demographic variables and economic justice related attitudes.  
Based on item content, a total of 39 items dealing with distributive justice norms (equity 
or equality), individual attributions, systems analysis, and support for government 
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redistribution were selected for the present analysis.  These items used either four- or 
five-point Likert response formats.∗     
Plan of Analysis 
 Because items comprising the survey were not developed as scales but as separate 
items, there was no a priori basis for treating groups of items as scales.  A review of the 
subsequent literature on the US sample of the ISJP revealed that the data from this 
portion of the sample has not been examined to establish scales and has been 
underutilized in general.  One study which did examine the factor structure of items from 
the US sample compared to West Germany and England (Swift, Marshall, Burgoyne, & 
Routh, 1995) used a series of items dealing with fairness judgments in hypothetical 
situations of limited resources such as hospital care and affordable housing (e.g., among 
people needing a medical treatment necessary for survival, who deserves it most?).   This 
study used a pool of items quite different than those relevant to the present study.  
Therefore, the analysis began with the establishment of a measurement model using 
exploratory factor analysis of the 39 selected items in a randomly selected half of the 
sample. This measurement model was then confirmed in the second half of the analysis.   
Once the measurement model was established, a hybrid structural equation model 
was tested specifying direct effects of latent constructs representing distributive justice 
norms, individual attributions, and systems analysis on the outcome, support for 
government action to reduce inequality.  This part of the analysis tested the relative 
                                                 
∗ For full details of the original study methods see the ISJP website 
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effects of each predictor construct on the outcome.  Finally, multigroup modeling was 
used to test for moderation of the effects of equity and individual attributions on the 
outcome by systems analysis.   
Chapter Four: Results 
Descriptive Statistics for Initial Item Pool 
The sample was initially split into two halves of 707 respondents using random 
selection of cases.  Each sample half was screened for missingness and univariate and 
multivariate normality (Appendix B).  Deletion of multivariate outlier cases resulted in a 
Half 1 sample of 659 cases and a Half 2 sample of 668 cases.  Descriptive statistics from 
the combined sample for each item from the initial item pool are shown in Table 1.   
                                                                                                                                                 
(http://www.butler.edu/isjp/intro.html). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Each Item from the Initial Item Pool (n = 1327) 
 M SD Skew Kurt 
In your view, how often is each of the following factors a reason why there are poor people in 
the US today? (1 = Very often / 5 = Never)     
V150 Lack of ability or talent 2.79 .99 -.01 -.37
V152 Loose morals and drunkenness 2.65 1.00 -.04 -.69
V153 Lack of effort by the poor themselves 2.49 .93 .01 -.56
V154 Prejudice and discrimination against certain groups in the US 2.75 .95 -.09 -.34
V155 Lack of equal opportunity 2.85 .96 -.13 -.43
V156 Failure of the economic system 2.60 .98 .10 -.56
In your view, how often is each of the following factors a reason why there are wealthy people 
in the US today? (1 = Very often / 5 = Never)     
V160 Ability or talent 2.27 .89 .27 -.35
V162 Dishonesty 2.61 .98 -.15 -.85
V163 Hard work 2.16 .92 .52 -.17
V164 Having the right connections 1.95 .79 .39 -.52
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 M SD Skew Kurt
V165 More opportunities to begin with 2.21 .89 .27 -.63
V166 The economic system allows them to take unfair advantage 2.71 1.00 -.07 -.68
V178.  Differences in incomes exist because ordinary people simply accept it.   
(1 = Strongly agree / 5 = Strongly disagree) 2.73 1.19 .42 -.99
V179.  There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in income are large 
enough. 2.58 1.24 .56 -.90
V180.  It is all right if businessmen make good profits because everyone benefits in the end. 2.90 1.43 .16 -1.44
V181.  People would not want to take extra responsibility at work unless they were paid extra 
for it. 2.30 1.35 .73 -.88
V196.  The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living.  2.71 1.46 .31 -1.38
V197.  The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one  
person can make. 4.21 1.26 -1.52 .93
V198.  The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one. 2.93 1.60 .08 -1.63
V248.  In the US, people have equal opportunities to get ahead. 2.53 1.19 .65 -.75
V249.  In the US, people get rewarded for their effort. 2.40 1.07 .92 -.04
V250.  In the US, people get what they need. 3.18 1.22 -.01 -1.32
V251.  In the US, people get rewarded for their intelligence and skill. 2.30 1.03 .99 .26
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 M SD Skew Kurt
V252.  The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal 
shares. 3.92 1.24 -.92 -.36
V253.  It’s fair if people have more money or wealth, but only if there are equal opportunities. 1.86 1.00 1.41 1.59
V254.  People are entitled to keep what they have earned -- even if this means some  
people will be wealthier than others. 1.53 .80 2.08 5.12
V255.  People who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not. 1.41 .76 2.36 6.15
V256.  People are entitled to pass on their wealth to their children. 1.20 .52 3.69 18.12
V257.  The most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this means  
allocating money from those who have earned more than they need. 3.12 1.42 .03 -1.46
V258.  It is just luck if some people are more intelligent or skillful than others, so  
they don’t deserve to earn more money. 4.14 1.12 -1.22 .41
V259.  It is just that people in some occupations are regarded more highly than people  
in other ones. 2.42 1.29 .78 -.60
V260.  It is just that disadvantaged groups are given extra help so that they can have  
equal opportunities in life. 1.98 1.00 1.30 1.35
V261.  It is just that those who can afford it obtain better education for their children. 2.47 1.41 .60 -1.05
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Here are some factors which are sometimes considered important far having a high social 
standing. Please tell me how important you think each is for success in our society today:  
(1 = Very important / 4 = Not at all important) M SD Skew Kurt
V275.  Social background 2.07 .81 .53 -.04
V276.  Ability and talent 1.56 .60 .71 .29
V277.  Hard work and effort 1.34 .55 1.34 .98
V278.  Having the right connections 1.81 .80 .86 .39
V279.  One's sex 2.64 .91 .05 -.89
V280.  Belonging to a particular (racial or ethnic/national group) 2.60 .97 .00 -1.00
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Descriptive statistics for individual items reflect some notable preliminary 
findings.  Responses to the causal attribution items (V150-V166) indicate greater 
endorsement of structural attributions for wealth than for poverty.  For example, 
participants were significantly more likely to agree that the wealthy have more 
opportunity, than that the poor have less [(V155-V166) average difference = .64; t(1326) 
= 19.82, p < .001].  Participants were most likely to attribute poverty to lack of effort, and 
wealth to hard work/effort.  By contrast, they were least likely to attribute poverty to lack 
of equal opportunity, and wealth to unfair advantage.  High social standing (V275-V280) 
was most commonly attributed to individual characteristics, but participants were 
markedly less likely to attribute social standing to gender or racial group membership.  
For example, comparing attributions of social standing to race versus hard work, the 
average difference between items 280 and 277 was 1.25, indicating significantly less 
acknowledgement that race determines high social standing [t(1326) = 37.92, p < .001].   
Items V252-V261 assessed different aspects of distributive justice norms.  For 
example, item V252 assessed participants’ endorsement of outright equality of outcome.  
The mean for this item was among the highest of all items and the frequency distribution 
was skewed towards disagreement (5% strongly agreed; 45% strongly disagreed).  In 
contrast, V254 and V255 measured endorsement of the equity distributive justice norm.  
These items had among the lowest means and standard deviations in the collection of 
items, indicating widespread endorsement of the equity principle.  They were also among 
the three variables (V254-V256) with significant departures from normality (absolute 
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value of skewness/kurtosis statistic > 2.3; Lei & Lomax, 2005).  This supports the 
hypothesis that equity would be commonly endorsed by most participants.  Furthermore, 
the high means for equality of outcome and redistribution items (V252, V257, V258) 
support the hypothesis that equality of outcome as a distributive justice norm would be 
rejected by most participants.   
Exploratory Factor Analysis  
 To determine the structure of attitudes toward inequality, exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) was conducted on the 39 items using principal axis extraction and 
varimax rotation.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .734 
and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p<.001), indicating that the observed 
data were factorable.  Visual inspection of the scree plot suggested 5 factors, and the 
rotated solution was very interpretable.   
 Twenty items had communalities below .2 and did not have a factor loading 
above .4 on any of the five factors (Appendix C).  These items were omitted from the 
final model.  The remaining 19 items were re-analyzed in a final EFA with principal axis 
extraction and varimax rotation of five factors.  The scree plot for the reduced set of 
items suggested a six-factor solution that accounted for 43% of the variance in the 19 
items.  Item loadings from the final exploratory factor analysis are shown in Appendix D.   
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Next, a confirmatory factor model based on the results from the exploratory factor 
analysis was fit to the data from the second half of the sample (n = 668).  The first model, 
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based entirely on the factor structure from the EFA, specified that each item loaded on 
only one factor according to its highest loading from the EFA. Three correlated residuals 
were added to account for method variance (common item wording; items originate from 
the same section of the survey; Appendix E).  Effects of these modifications on loadings 
and meaning of related factors were minimal.  These modifications were retained in all 
subsequent models.   
Fit statistics for the specified model based on the EFA fit to the second sample are 
shown in Table 2 in contrast to two alternative models. The two alternatives considered 
were a single factor model, and a model with five rather than six latent constructs, 
combining structural attributions for poverty and wealth into a single factor as a test of 
the hypothesis that structural attributions for wealth and poverty form a single construct 
representing systems analysis.   
Table 2. Fit Statistics for Three Specified Models Fit to Half 2 (n = 668) 
 Parameters χ2/df TLI CFI RMSEA PCLOSE 
Single factor model 57 11.276 .288 .367 .124 .000 
Alternative model   69 2.601 .889 .909 .049 .596 
EFA-based model 74 2.119 .922 .939 .041 .989 
  
Results in Table 2 indicate that the best-fitting model is the EFA-based model.   
The single factor model representing the possibility that all 19 items measure a single 
construct was not supported.  The second alternative model tested the hypothesis that 
structural attributions for poverty and wealth form a single construct.  This model fit 
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significantly less well than the EFA-based model.  The increase in chi-squared was 
78.039 on 5 degrees of freedom (∆χ2/df  = 15.608), a significant decrease in fit (p < 
.001).  The TLI, CFI, and RMSEA were also markedly better for the EFA-based model 
compared to the alternative model.  In sum, fit indices uniformly indicate that the EFA-
based model fits better than both the alternative model and the single-factor model.   
 Overall the results from the EFA in one half of the sample were confirmed in the 
second half of the sample.  Subsequent multigroup modeling across the two halves of 
sample compared a fully unconstrained model to a model with measurement weights 
constrained and found adequate fit for both models and no significant differences in fit 
between models (Table 3).  These results indicate both configural and metric invariance 
of the model across halves of the sample, justifying the assumption that the latent 
variables are measured similarly in both halves (Appendix F).   
Table 3. Comparative Model Fit Between Two Random Halves of Sample 
Model param χ2 df χ2/ df TLI CFI ∆χ2 ∆df 
Unconstrained 147 584.33 271 2.16 .919 .936 -- -- 
Measurement weights 134 597.32 284 2.10 .923 .936 12.99 13 
*p < .05 
 
Taken together these findings indicate that the model fits adequately in both samples.  Fit 
statistics for the combined sample (n = 1327) indicate adequate overall fit (χ2/df = 3.13; 
TLI = .93; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .04, PCLOSE =1.0).  The final model is shown in Figure 
2. 
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 The model contains four factors representing different aspects of systems 
analysis.  The first, called equal opportunity, was comprised of four items measuring the 
extent to which respondents feel that people are generally rewarded equitably and that 
there is equal opportunity one aspect of systems analysis.  For example, the highest 
loading item for this factor reads, “In the US, people get rewarded for their effort”, and 
another item states, “In the US, people have equal opportunities to get ahead.”  
Standardized item alpha for the equal opportunity scale was .73.   
 The next two systems analysis factors assessed structural attributions for poverty 
and wealth separately.  The structural attributions for poverty scale is comprised of two 
items assessing the extent to which poverty is due to inequality of opportunity or 
discrimination (a = .75).  The structural attributions for wealth scale was comprised of 
three items assessing the extent to which respondents believe a person being wealthy is 
due to having more opportunities, having social connections, or an economic system that 
allows them to take unfair advantage (a = .59).   
 The fourth systems analysis factor assessed individual and structural attributions 
for “high social standing” rather than poverty or wealth.  The items in this factor assessed 
the importance of race, sex, knowing the right people, and social background as factors in 
determining social standing (a = .73).   Aside from item wording this attribution factor, 
called group-based attributions, is different from the other structural attribution factors in 
that it deals explicitly with social group membership (race and sex; two strongest loading 
items) as a factor in determining outcomes.  These four systems analysis constructs 
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represent different aspects of respondents’ acknowledgement that structural factors 
determine economic outcomes to a certain extent, and that resources are not distributed 
solely based on merit.  
The fifth factor consists of two items assessing individual attributions for poverty.   
Worded similarly to the structural attribution items, these items measure the extent to 
which respondents believe poverty is due to individual deficits of character, specifically 
lack of effort and loose morals.  Standardized item alpha for these two items was .57.   
 The final factor assessed support for government redistribution to reduce 
inequality.  The four items in this factor concern the government’s role in reducing 
inequality (e.g., “The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of 
living.”)  Standardized item alpha for these four items was .69.  This variable serves as 
the outcome variable in these analyses. 
It should be noted that hypothesized distributive justice norms (i.e., equity and 
equality of outcome) are not represented in the measurement model.  Although 
descriptive statistics for single items indicated that equity was commonly endorsed by 
most participants and equality of outcome was commonly rejected, because they are not 
present in the measurement model distributive justice norms will not be further addressed 
in these analyses.   
The final model includes a structural portion in which unanalyzed associations 
between predictors and the outcome have been replaced by directional effects, which is 
the equivalent of a multiple regression of the redistribution outcome on the five latent 
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constructs, allowing the examination of the relative effects of each predictor on the 
outcome.  The final model also includes demographic covariates expected to be related to 
both predictors and outcomes.  The sample size is reduced from 1327 to 1258 with the 
exclusion of 69 participants who selected a racial identity other than Black or White.  
Model fit (n = 1258) with the inclusion of demographic covariates was adequate (χ2/df = 
2.94; TLI = .90; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .04, PCLOSE =1.0).  All predictors, including 
covariates, have unanalyzed associations between them and each has a direct effect on 
the outcome redistribution scale.  Unanalyzed associations between demographic 
covariates and predictor variables are not shown for clarity.  Prior to discussing the 
hypothesized effects of predictors on the outcome, the measurement characteristics of the 
model will be considered first.  
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Figure 2.  Final Model with Standardized Parameters 
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As evidence for validity of the measurement model, convergent validity will be 
considered first.  Following a process described by Fornell and Larcker (1981), 
proportions of variance explained in the indicators of each latent variable were calculated 
from the standardized item loadings (Appendix G).  Proportions of variance explained 
ranged from a low of 27% for the structural attributions for wealth construct, to a high of 
57% for the structural attributions for poverty construct.  Representing the extent to 
which variance is shared between the indicators of a latent variable, these values indicate 
convergent validity at the item level.  Although some of these extracted variance values 
are below the 50% rule-of-thumb suggested by Fornell and Larcker, the standardized 
factor loadings were moderate to strong for all latent variables (Figure 2). 
 Discriminant validity of the latent constructs was examined via the correlations 
between latent variables from the model (Figure 2) which were generally weak to 
moderate.  The moderate correlation between structural attributions for poverty and 
wealth is similar to that found between similar scales by Kluegel and Smith (1986; r = 
.42).   The structural attribution constructs were also moderately correlated with group-
based attributions and equal opportunity in expected directions.  Individual attributions 
for poverty representing the view that poverty is due to individual deficits in character 
was virtually unassociated with structural attributions for poverty and wealth, similar to 
previous findings (Feagin, 1975; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).     
Unit-weighted factor scores were computed for each latent construct and 
correlated with each of the demographic covariates.  Means and standard deviations for 
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each scale are shown in Appendix H, and the bivariate correlations with demographic 
variables are shown in Table 4.  Associations of scales with demographic indicators of 
privilege mirrored previous findings showing that members of privileged groups (White 
males of middle to high SES) tend to hold attitudes justifying the status quo (Cozarelli, 
Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Mitchell et al., 1993 & 2001; Sidanius, 1990).  As shown in 
Table 4, men and Whites were less likely to make structural attributions for poverty and 
more likely to believe that equal opportunity exists, and were less supportive of 
government action to reduce inequality.  Similarly, as income increased respondents were 
slightly less likely to make structural attributions for wealth, more likely to believe that 
equal opportunity exists, and much more likely to oppose government action to reduce 
inequality.  These findings provide further support for the validity of the measurement 
model. 
Tests of Structural Hypotheses 
 The next step of the analysis was to test hypotheses pertaining to the structural 
portion of the model.  Relative effects of each of the predictor constructs on support for 
government action to reduce inequality were examined.  The relative effects of the five 
predictor constructs are represented by the straight arrows pointing to government action 
to reduce inequality in Figure 2.  Two systems analysis constructs, structural attributions 
for wealth and poverty, had significant positive effects on support for government action 
to reduce inequality.  The other systems analysis constructs, group-based attributions and 
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equal opportunity, were not significantly related to support for redistribution.  Individual 
attributions for poverty were negatively related to support for redistribution.   
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Table 4. Correlations of Scales with Demographic Variables 
 
Sex  
(0 = M) 
Race  
(0 = W) Age 
Level of 
education 
Income 
(z) 
Party  
(1=Dem) 
1.  Equal opportunity  
     (1=Strongly agree / 5 = Strongly Disagree) .17* .09* -.07* -.00 -.06* -.20* 
2.  Structural attributions wealth 
     (1 = Very often / 5 = Never) -.05 -.02* -.03 -.02 .06* .17* 
3.  Structural attributions poverty 
     (1 = Very often / 5 = Never) -.06* -.21* -.07* -.03 .02 .23* 
4.  Group-based attributions  
     (1 = Very important / 4 = Not at all important) -.03 -.07* -.06* -.05 -.02 .04 
5.  Individual attributions poverty  
     (1 = Very often / 5 = Never) .01 -.01 -.11* .21* .04 -.08* 
6.  Government redistribution 
     (1=Strongly agree / 5 = Strongly Disagree) -.17* -.23* -.10* .27* .21* .31* 
*p < .05 
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Next, each of the four systems analysis constructs – structural attributions for 
poverty and wealth, group-based attributions, and the belief that equal opportunity exists 
–were tested as moderators of the effect of individual attributions on support for 
government action to reduce inequality.  Note that effects of both equity and individual 
attributions on the outcome were expected to be moderated by systems analysis.   
However, because equity was not included in the model, only moderation of individual 
attributions was tested.  Multi-group modeling was used to test moderation.  For each 
systems analysis construct, the sample was median split by the moderator variable to 
define groups low and high in systems analysis (Appendix I). Moderation was tested by 
comparing the fit of the fully unconstrained multi-group model to a model with the 
effects of the remaining four predictors on the outcome constrained to equality across 
groups.  Results indicated that only moderation by structural attributions for poverty was 
statistically significant (Table 5).  Differences in parameter estimates for effects of the 
five predictors on the outcome in the two structural attribution groups provide further 
support for the moderation hypothesis (Table 6).
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Table 5. Multi-group Modeling for Low and High Systems Analysis Groups 
Model param χ2 df χ2/ df TLI CFI ∆χ2 ∆df 
Unconstrained 239 711.605 359 1.982 .892 .923 -- -- 
Equality constraints 235 721.515 363 1.988 .891 .922 9.910* 4 
*p < .05 
  
Table 6. Unstandardized Effects of Predictors in Low and High Systems Analysis Groups 
 Low High 
Individual attributions poverty -.29** -.09 
Structural attributions wealth .21* .10 
Group-based attributions -.09 .04 
Equal opportunity .06 -.04 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Although individual attributions were negatively related to support for government action 
to reduce inequality in the whole sample, the interaction of systems analysis clarifies this 
relationship.  Individual attributions for poverty were only related to support for 
redistribution among respondents with low systems analysis (i.e., poverty is determined 
by structural factors sometimes, rarely, or never).  Individual attributions for poverty 
were unrelated to support for government action to reduce inequality when systems 
analysis was high.  With the removal of 359 cases that selected the midpoint of the scale 
(‘sometimes’) for both indicators of structural attributions for poverty, the systems 
analysis moderation was even more pronounced.  Individual attributions were strongly 
negatively associated with support for government action to reduce inequality (b=-.52, 
p=.03) when systems analysis was low, but was unassociated with the outcome when 
systems analysis was high (b=-.11, ns). This finding is particularly convincing given that 
systems analysis was unrelated to individual attributions for poverty.  Mean levels of 
individual attributions for poverty were virtually equivalent across the low and high 
systems analysis groups [t(1256) = -.32, ns].  Though not hypothesized, the effect of 
structural attributions for wealth was also moderated, such that structural attributions for 
wealth were related to support for redistribution only among respondents with low 
systems analysis.   
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
The primary purpose of this study was to illustrate that differences between 
supporters and opponents of efforts to reduce economic inequality are not irreducible 
moral differences in beliefs about personal responsibility and equitable distributions of 
resources, but differences in beliefs about how resources are actually distributed in 
society.   
Descriptive statistics for the items on distributive justice norms supported the 
hypothesis that equity is endorsed by nearly all participants, and that equality of outcome 
is generally unpopular.  Regarding equity, almost all respondents agreed that “People 
who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not,” and that, “People are 
entitled to keep what they have earned – even if this means some people will be wealthier 
than others.”  There was also support for the hypothesis that very few people support 
outright equality of outcome.  More than 72% of respondents disagreed that the fairest 
way of distributing resources would be to give everyone equal shares.  This item loaded 
with the government redistribution outcome variable, reflecting a strong association 
between endorsement of equality of outcome and support for redistribution.  The low 
endorsement of equality of outcome supports William Ryan’s (1981) contention that 
equality of outcome is a straw man erected to engender knee-jerk rejections of calls for 
reduced inequality.  Unfortunately, the inability to develop scales for either distributive 
justice norm precluded tests of the hypothesized moderation of the relationship between 
equity and support for redistribution by systems analysis.   
68 
 
The distributive justice norms reflect participants’ view of how resources should 
be distributed.  There was much less consensus about how resources are distributed.  
Development of the measurement model produced one individual attribution factor and 
four factors assessing different aspects of systems analysis.  The first hypothesis for the 
measurement model was supported: individual and structural attributions formed separate 
weakly-correlated constructs.  This indicates that individual and structural attributions are 
independent dimensions of variation between people.  The near-zero correlation between 
the two, indicates that many people hold individuals responsible for their own success 
while acknowledging that structural factors influence economic outcomes.   
The second hypothesis for the measurement model was not supported.  I predicted 
that structural attributions for poverty and wealth would form a single construct 
representing systems analysis.  A factor model forcing the structural attribution items into 
a single factor fit significantly less well than one with separate structural attribution 
factors.  The final measurement model also included two other constructs – group-based 
attributions and belief that equal opportunity exists – that were conceptualized as 
additional aspects of systems analysis.  Attribution of social standing to race and gender, 
and acknowledgement that opportunity is not distributed equally, both reflect the 
assessment that resources are not distributed solely based on merit.  Although the best-
fitting model distinguished between these different aspects of systems analysis, the 
positive correlations between them provide initial support for the concept.   
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When the five predictor constructs were tested for their relative effects on the 
outcome, the hypothesis that systems analysis is a stronger predictor than individual 
attributions was supported.  Results indicated that structural attributions for poverty had 
the strongest effect on support for redistribution, and that structural attributions for 
wealth were also positively related to the outcome.  Group-based attributions and the 
belief that equal opportunity exists were not significantly related to support for 
government redistribution.   
Individual attributions were negatively related to support for government action to 
reduce inequality.  As hypothesized, this effect was moderated by systems analysis.  
Individual attributions were only negatively related to support for redistribution among 
respondents with low systems analysis.  Respondents with high systems analysis made 
individual attributions as often, but in this group, increased individual attributions were 
not associated with decreased support for redistribution.  Participants with high systems 
analysis acknowledge that economic outcomes are not determined solely by individual 
merit, thus they believe that resources are not distributed fairly.  Because the distribution 
of resources is not judged to be fair, redistribution of resources is justified, despite the 
value of personal responsibility.  On the other hand, if systems analysis is low, the 
distribution of resources is perceived to be fair.  Therefore, in defense of the status quo, 
redistribution is rejected in the name of personal responsibility.   
Together, tests of structural hypotheses indicate that systems analysis is the key 
determinant of attitudes toward redistribution. Almost everyone in the sample believed in 
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proportional distributions of rewards, and rejected equality of outcome.  Respondents 
also commonly endorsed personal responsibility, as measured by individual attributions 
for poverty.  The structural attribution factors, representing systems analysis, were the 
strongest predictors of the outcome.  Ultimately, individual attributions for poverty were 
endorsed similarly across groups low and high in systems analysis, but were only 
associated with opposition to redistribution among participants with low systems 
analysis.  Systems analysis, the perception of the extent to which structural factors 
determine economic outcomes, was the central determinant of justification or rejection of 
the unequal status quo. 
Implications for Theory and Measurement 
This study rested on a key conceptual distinction between beliefs about how 
resources should be distributed and beliefs about how resources are distributed.  
Distributive justice norms were conceptualized as moral judgments about how resources 
should be distributed.  Causal attributions were conceptualized as components of analysis 
of how resources are distributed.  The distinction between moral assertions and 
observations is an important one for conceptual and empirical clarity of future research 
on attitudes toward the distribution of resources, though it has been obscured in previous 
studies.  Nosworthy, Lea, and Lindsay (1995) note that belief in a just world is often 
described as a measure of proportionality (i.e., equity) as a distributive justice norm, 
though scales measuring the construct emphasize beliefs about the extent to which 
proportionality actually exists in reality.  Recognizing this, Davey et al. (1999) developed 
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the Belief in Merit Scale which taps the belief that equity is a desirable ideal for 
distributions of resources.  The present study attempted to measure both dimensions of 
equity separately, by measuring equity as a distributive justice norm and systems analysis 
as an indicator of respondents’ assessment of the extent to which rewards are distributed 
equitably in society.  This distinction enabled illustration of common endorsement of 
equity as an ideal, but large variability in respondents’ assessment of the actual 
equitability of current resource distributions.  Although it was not attempted in the 
present study, a similar distinction could be made for individual attributions, which are 
likely to reflect both the view that characteristics of individuals should determine 
outcomes and the view that characteristics of individuals actually do determine outcomes.   
The present study also has implications for the relationship between equity and 
equality of outcome.  First, it appears that any measure of the equity distributive justice 
norm will need to be more precise than what was attempted here.  That value appears to 
be so predominant that its measurement needs to allow for finer degrees of variation than 
a five-point scale can provide.  The same can be said for equality of outcome.  
Alternative measurement methods may provide greater sensitivity and also abolish the 
false dichotomy between ideal notions of equity and equality.  As discussed in the 
literature review, the concept of proportionality is straightforward when considering 
inputs and rewards of an agreed upon value, but determining the value of inputs and 
rewards is most often entirely subjective.  As Verba and colleagues noted, “That some 
income difference is justified by both efficiency and desert does not imply the degree of 
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that difference” (1987, p. 118).  Even when equity is a preferred norm of distributive 
justice one still has to decide how much more valuable the inputs of a teacher and a 
doctor should be, for example.  A truly valid measure of equity would account separately 
for valuations of both inputs and rewards.  Quantitative measures assessing the ideal ratio 
between high and low wages are desirable because they allow continuous numerical 
variation and a wide range of possible scores.  This measure would need to account for 
wages (rewards) and separately assess valuation of the work (input).  Equity would be 
indicated by perfect proportionality between inputs and rewards (e.g., a job valued 5 
times more than another job should receive 5 times the compensation.)  Equality of 
outcome on the other hand, would be indicated by the degree of equality that is desired, 
which could apply to both valuation of inputs and outputs, independent of equity.  That is 
the difference between high and low inputs and outputs could be large or small, 
regardless of the amount of proportionality between inputs and outputs.  Such an 
approach would shift the focus away from a false dichotomy between simplistic notions 
of absolute equality of outcome or equity, focusing instead on the degree of inequality 
(or equality) of outcome and the degree of proportionality between inputs and rewards, 
that is endorsed by respondents.  
The literature review for this study also illustrated that causal attributions for 
poverty and wealth are likely to be dependent on racial group biases, so research methods 
accounting for the race of the target and the respondent would be desirable.  Future 
studies using survey measures of attitudes toward inequality in homogeneous samples 
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should address the race (and gender, class, etc.) of the participant and the target when 
assessing distributive justice norms and causal attributions.  This approach would allow 
for participant/target demographic combinations to be used as a predictor variable or 
covariate.  An alternative approach to account for group bias would be to incorporate a 
measure of racism or other group bias in a demographically homogeneous sample.   
The results of the present study also have implications for future research 
examining predictors of commitment to distributive justice norms.  Previous research 
treating commitment to distributive justice norms as an individual difference variable, 
such as Rokeach’s work on egalitarian values (1973) and Sidanius and Pratto’s (1999) 
work on social dominance orientation, suggests that commitment to equality is a 
personality trait.  The present study has attempted to shift the focus away from 
irreducible differences in the moral commitments made by different types of people, to a 
seemingly more changeable concept of the type of knowledge that is applied to 
understanding how resources are distributed.  Taking the lead of previous studies by 
Mitchell et al. (2001) and Bobocel et al. (1998) that showed that endorsement of 
distributive justice norms is dependent upon perceived fairness in the distribution of 
resources, the present study has illustrated that respondents’ analysis of how fairly 
resources are distributed determines support for efforts to reduce inequality.  The present 
study suggests that preference for equity is a given in the US, and that perceptions of how 
fairly resources have been distributed are the most important predictor of support for 
redistribution.  Analysis of how resources are distributed in society is also more favorable 
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from a practical perspective because it may be more malleable than moral commitment to 
distributive justice norms.   
Respondent’s analysis of how fairly resources have been distributed proved to be 
the most powerful predictor of support for government redistribution.  The systems 
analysis concept which lies at the center of the conceptual foundation for this study is 
defined by a broadening of causal understanding of events, both temporally and spatially, 
beyond the typical tendency towards individual causal attributions.  The present study 
produced four scales measuring different aspects of systems analysis and the associated 
belief that resources have been distributed fairly.  These four factors were conceptually 
coherent as different aspects of the systems analysis concept, but they performed quite 
differently as predictors of support for efforts to reduce inequality suggesting that further 
development of the systems analysis measure is needed.  The factor structure of systems 
analysis in the present study should be considered an initial empirical exploration into the 
components of systems analysis, but the results indicate that the concept is worthy of 
further investigation. One way in which measurement of the systems analysis concept 
could be improved is by including items that assess causal attributions for phenomena 
other than poverty and wealth.  Every phenomenon has determinants that are not 
temporally located in the present or spatially located within the physical space of the 
phenomenon itself.  If systems analysis truly represents an underlying tendency towards 
structural attributions, then people with high systems analysis should make more 
structural attributions regardless of the phenomenon of interest.  Items could also be 
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included that separate the temporal and spatial dimensions of structural attributions.  For 
example, the present study measured “discrimination” as a generic structural factor 
determining poverty and wealth, but discrimination could be detailed in terms of the type 
of discrimination (racial, gender, etc.), the context for the discrimination (e.g., work, 
school, public), and the historical dimension of discrimination as well.  Such 
measurement improvements in future studies would contribute to the conceptual and 
empirical development of the systems analysis concept. 
Implications for Practice 
The practical significance of these findings is in challenging popular justifications 
for current economic inequality.  If people are to support structural solutions for 
economic inequality, it is critical that they learn ways to recognize the role that structural 
factors play in determining economic outcomes.  There is evidence that there is a great 
deal of progress to be made in this area.  The American preference for individualistic 
explanations for behavior is well-documented (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Feagin, 1975).  
Within US society, as shown in the present study and elsewhere (Bobo, 1991; Cozarelli, 
Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001;  Feagin, 1975; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lee, Jones, & Lewis, 
1990), persons with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo such as White males 
are particularly unlikely to acknowledge that structural factors like discrimination and 
privilege determine who becomes wealthy and who becomes poor.  Ironically, it appears 
that the more structurally disadvantaged a person is, the less likely their situation is to be 
adequately understood in structural terms.  Cited earlier, Iyengar (1990) found that 
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people were most likely to blame Black women for being poor, despite the fact that Black 
women were the most structural disadvantaged targets in the study.  Similarly, findings 
from experimental studies of distributive justice found that distributions by group 
members were less equal the more inequality there was in group member status 
(Komorita & Parks, 1994).  That is, group members were less likely to share with more 
needy group members.   
One explanation for such phenomena is that people who are not successful are 
perceived as inherently unsuccessful—individualistic attributions are made about their 
situation, so they are judged unworthy of resource distributions.  In other words, poor 
people are judged to be unworthy of money because they are poor.  This is a particularly 
insidious circular reasoning that may be one mechanism by which the rich get richer and 
the poor get poorer.  It is also precisely the opposite of what a compassionate reaction 
might be.  The results of this study indicate that heightening individuals’ sensitivity to the 
determining role that structural factors have in deciding who succeeds and who fails can 
attenuate this process of “blaming the victim.”  The question becomes, how best to 
enhance individuals’ systems analytic skills. 
 The systems analysis concept at the center of the present study is derived from the 
literature on critical consciousness raising (Freire, 1970; Serrano-Garcia, 1994) and 
sociopolitical development (Watts, Williams, & Jagers, 2003).  These theories describe 
the process of liberation of oppressed persons.  A major component of this process is the 
development of an understanding of the historical and contextual determinants of 
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behavior, what I have called systems analysis.  Current methods for critical 
consciousness-raising tend to derive from Freire’s model of critical pedagogy.  This 
model emphasizes a horizontal co-learner relationship between teacher and student and 
stresses the dialectical relationship between thought and action, which is praxis (1970).  
Although models such as this can provide a foundation for development of education 
interventions for systems analysis, their focus on education for oppressed persons leaves 
out the unique dynamics of developing systems analysis in privileged persons.  
Justifications for inequality such as equity and individual attributions are most likely to 
be used by members of privileged groups.  Members of privileged groups are likely to be 
ignorant of their privilege and of the way in which seemingly benevolent values like 
proportionality and personal responsibility serve to justify a system of domination and 
subordination (Goodman, 2001).  Recent work has begun to address the unique 
challenges of critical consciousness-raising for members of privileged groups.  For 
example, research on White racial identity development (Helms, 1984; 1995) and 
acknowledgement of privilege (Ancis & Szymanski, 2001; Lazos Vargas, 1998; 
McIntosh, 1988; 1989) can help educators approach the obliviousness and resistance that 
are likely to precede engagement in consciousness-raising by members of privileged 
groups.   
 Beyond pedagogy, there are other interventions that can contribute to the 
development of systems analysis.  Harper (1999) reviews studies demonstrating the 
influential role that media images of poverty have in determining popular views of causes 
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and solutions.  For example, the study by Iyengar (1990) cited earlier demonstrated that 
causal attributions were subject to change by experimental manipulation of the portrayal 
of poverty in media images presented to participants.  Respondents who saw poverty 
portrayed as a structural problem were more likely to make structural attributions than 
were respondents who saw media portrayals of individual victims of poverty.  Harper’s 
chapter also deals with practical strategies for influencing media outlets, for example 
pressure from organized public interest groups that can off-set the vested interests of 
corporate sponsors.   
 Whatever the method, pathways for shaping public understanding of the causes of 
economic inequality need to attend to the cognitively complex reality that resource 
distributions are determined by both individual and structural factors.  Prominent 
American values like proportionality and personal responsibility must be affirmed at the 
same time that structural determinants of behavior are understood.    
Returning to an issue raised earlier in the introduction, community psychology’s 
fundamental commitment to “social justice” needs to be qualified by an in-depth 
examination of the relationship between equity and equality of outcome.  Prilleltensky 
(2001) defined social justice as, “fair and equitable allocation of bargaining powers, 
resources, and obligations in society in consideration of individuals’ differential power, 
needs, and abilities to express their wishes” (p. 754).  Bell (1997) defined social justice 
as, “full and equal participation of all groups in a society that is mutually shaped to meet 
their needs.  Social justice includes a vision of society in which the distribution of 
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resources is equitable and all members are physically and psychologically safe and 
secure” (p. 3).   Both of these definitions emphasize equitable distributions of resources.  
However, left unregulated, an equitable society with persons of varying ability, talent, 
initiative, etc. will inevitably produce unequal economic outcomes.  Given that 
opportunity is tied to material resources, that the children of wealthy people tend to have 
more opportunities than children of poor people, the inequality that results from an 
equitable distribution system becomes inherently unjust.  Reflecting the understanding 
that equity inevitably leads to inequity, community psychology’s emphasis on social 
justice should be targeted specifically at eliminating the link between opportunity and 
wealth, via support for equal funding for public schools, for example.  Or else, 
community psychology can attempt to reduce economic inequality.  In either case, 
increased equality of resources, not to be confused with a desire for outright equality of 
outcome, can figure as or more prominently than equity in definitions of social justice, 
and the relationship between equity and inequality needs to be explicated.  Finally, 
community psychology’s call for greater equality should include endorsements of self-
determination and proportionality, because these values are as important to advocates for 
reduced inequality as they are to defenders of the status quo.  The difference is that 
supporters of reduced inequality give greater weight to the determining role that 
structural factors play in the distribution of resources.  
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Limitations  
One of the most obvious limitations of this study is that the data were gathered in 
1991 which may adversely affect the external validity of the results.  However previous 
work (Kluegel & Smith, 1986) comparing attitudes to inequality in the 1980s and 70s 
indicates that distributive justice norms and causal attributions are fairly stable in the 
population over time.  On the other hand, attitudes about race and gender and the role that 
discrimination plays in determining outcomes may be more likely to change. Weighing 
against this potential shortcoming are the dataset’s strengths of size and 
representativeness. 
Another potential limitation of the study is that the development of the 
measurement model was largely data-driven.  The method of independent confirmation of 
factor structure from one half to the other half of the sample provided evidence for the 
construct validity of the measurement model, but testing on another sample altogether 
would have been a stronger design.  Also, as with any factor analysis, the factor structure 
is dependent on the pool of items selected for analysis.  Although this is not an absolutely 
complete set of items – for example, it may have benefited from the inclusion of different 
measures of distributive justice norms – the measurement model in this study is based on 
a more inclusive set of items than any previous study on the structure of attitudes toward 
inequality.  Additionally, although development of the measurement model rested on 
many empirical decisions, these decisions were qualified by theoretical bases at every 
turn.   
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One final limitation of the present study is the operationalization of the outcome 
variable.  The concept of interest as an outcome is support for action to reduce inequality.  
The present operationalization assesses support for general government action to reduce 
inequality, but the means by which inequality is to be reduced are not very specific.  It is 
possible that opposition to government action to reduce inequality as measured here is as 
much a reflection of opposition to the government in general, or to a specific policy, as it 
is a reflection of resistance to reducing inequality.  A behavioral measure of support or 
even of direct action on the part of respondents to reduce inequality would be better than 
the current measure.  Regarding expressed support, a mock ballot initiative would add to 
the realism of the measure, possibly providing a more valid assessment.  Regarding 
action, personal actions to reduce inequality might include charitable giving, volunteer 
work, advocacy for public policy such as progressive tax estate tax, and membership in 
organizations that directly benefit the poor, etc.  Future studies on this topic can benefit 
from more direct measures of action to reduce inequality.   
 Overall, the present study has accomplished its primary purpose of illustrating 
that supporters and opponents of government action to reduce inequality share a common 
appreciation for values of personal responsibility and equity, but that they differ in the 
extent to which they acknowledge that systemic factors determine economic outcomes.  It 
is hoped that supporters and opponents of efforts to reduce inequality can understand 
their similar endorsement of values like equity and personal responsibility, and focus 
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their discourse on differences in the degree to which the system plays an inequitable role 
in the distribution of resources.   
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Appendixes 
Appendix A.  Sampling Procedure 
The US survey for the ISJP used random sampling of US citizens aged 18 or older 
residing in telephone households in the continental US.  A two-stage process was used 
first selecting 1500 Area/Central Office (CO) codes (first six digits of a complete phone 
number) from the 42,562 Area/CO codes listed in 1990.  This random selection of 
Area/CO codes was done with stratification by geography and population density.  Then 
randomly generated strings of four digits were appended to the end of each of the 1500 
Area/CO combinations to create a set of 1500 dialable phone numbers of which 318 
proved to be working numbers.  The last eight digits of these 318 phone numbers became 
the first 8 numbers of a secondary pool of numbers.  Random number generation was 
used to add two digits to these secondary numbers, in order to create a second set of 1500 
eligible numbers.  These secondary numbers were then called, and if a number was a 
working household number an interview was conducted.  This process was repeated until 
the desired sample size had been obtained.   
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Appendix B. Data Screening Procedure 
Univariate screening consisted of examining histograms and skewness and 
kurtosis statistics from SPSS. Three variables (254, 255, & 256) evidenced severely 
nonnormal distributions (absolute value of skewness/kurtosis statistic > 2.3; Lei & 
Lomax, 2005).  Absolute values of skewness and kurtosis are preferred because z-scores 
(e.g., skewness/s.e.) are dependent on sample size.  Based on visual inspection of the 
distributions, items 254 and 255 were transformed using (-1/sqrtX) and item 256 was 
transformed using (-1/X).  These transformations brought skewness and kurtosis statistics 
to within the moderate severity range for 254 and 255, but 256 remained significantly 
nonnormal.   
Screening for multivariate normality consisted of computing Mahalanobis 
distances using SPSS linear regression with all 39 items as predictors of an irrelevant 
outcome variable, case ID number.  Mahalanobis distances can be compared to a critical 
threshold which is distributed as chi-squared where df is the number of predictors in the 
multivariate distribution.  In Half 1, the exploratory factor analysis sample, 48 cases were 
identified with extreme Mahalanobis distances, leaving a final sample of 659.  In Half 2 
39 multivariate outlier cases were deleted leaving a final sample of 668 for the 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
Finally, for each sample half, missing values analysis in SPSS was used to screen 
cases with abnormal patterns of missingness, and regression-based imputation using all 
39 variables was used to replace missing values for cases without extraordinary 
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missingness (Half 1: imputation for 10% of cases; <1% of datapoints; Half 2: imputation 
for 11% of cases; <1% of datapoints).   
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Appendix C.  Items Omitted from the Final Model After Exploratory Factor Analysis. 
Items not contributing to the 5-factor solution included three attribution items 
concerning ability (150, 160, 276) which had relatively low loadings on individual and 
structural attribution factors in an earlier study (Kluegel & Smith, 1986).  Other low-
loading items included two items assessing individual attributions for wealth and high 
social standing respectively (163 & 277), two items apparently dealing with justification 
for inequality (178 & 180), and two items assessing practical reasons for proportional 
distributions (179 & 181).  Among the low loading items were also a group of items 
apparently directly related to the equity distributive justice norm (253, 254, 255, 256, 
257, 258, 259, 260, & 261).  The fact that this latter set of items with apparently related 
content did not form a stable construct reflects the complexity and multidimensionality of 
justifications for inequality.  The failure to form an equity factor is also due at least in 
part to the skewed distributions for items 254, 255, and 256, characterized by low 
variance and means near the end of the scale indicating strong endorsement.  Finally, two 
other attribution items (156 & 162) were omitted due to cross-loadings on more than one 
factor.  All of these items were omitted from the subsequent model.   
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Appendix D.  Exploratory Factor Analysis Results of Six-Factor Solution Using Principle Axis Extraction and Varimax  
Rotation (n = 659) 
Item   Factor 1  
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Factor 
6  
V249.  In the US, people get rewarded for their effort. .803      
V251.  In the US, people get rewarded for their intelligence and skill. .636      
V248.  In the US, people have equal opportunities to get ahead. .544      
V250.  In the US, people get what they need. .538      
Reasons there are poor people:       
V154.  Discrimination  .754     
V155.  Lack of opportunity  .727     
Reasons there are wealthy people:       
V165.  More opportunities to begin with   .590    
V164.  Having the right connections   .587    
V166.  The economic system allows them to take unfair advantage   .482    
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Item Factor 1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Factor 
6 
Factors considered important for having a high social standing: (.73)       
V280.  Belonging to a particular racial or ethnic group    .691   
V279.  One's sex    .594   
V278.  Having the right connections    .497   
V275.  Social background    .759   
Reasons there are poor people:       
V153.  Lack of effort     .654  
V152.  Loose morals     .583  
V252.  The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give  
everyone equal shares.      .673 
V196.  The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of  
living.      .625 
V198.  The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.      .593 
V197.  The government should place an upper limit on the amount of  
money any one person can make.      .485 
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Appendix E. Modifications to Measurement Model in Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Three correlated residuals were added to account for method variance.  Two 
correlated errors were added because they originated from the same question stem 
(V164ÅÆV165; V275ÅÆ278).  One other correlated error was added between items 
V164 & V278 to account for common item wording (“Having the right connections.”)   
Effects of these modifications on loadings and meaning of related factors were minimal.  
The only other change was the constraining of error variances to equality for the 
individual attributions for poverty factor.  The solution was inadmissible without this 
modification, and this was the most minor modification that could be made to fix the 
problem.  Model fit was unchanged by this modification.  These modifications were 
retained in all subsequent models.   
 
 
104 
 
Appendix F. Multigroup Modeling to Establish Measurement Invariance Across Half 1 
and Half 2 of the Sample 
Multigroup modeling was conducted to evaluate measurement invariance across 
the two halves of the sample.  An initial test of equality of the covariance structures for 
the two halves indicated that their respective covariance structures were not equivalent 
(Box’s M = 237.95, p = .02).  Then, the measurement weights were constrained to 
equality across the two halves of the sample as a test of measurement invariance.  
Evaluation of measurement invariance in the multigroup confirmatory factor analysis 
framework is usually based on chi-squared difference testing.  However values of chi-
squared are known to be dependent on sample size, as are chi-squared difference values, 
such that the likelihood of rejecting a model increases with sample size (Cheung & 
Rensvold, 2002).  Therefore, Cheung and Rensvold suggest examination of incremental 
change in other fit indices such as the commonly reported CFI, because it is unaffected 
by sample size.  They used simulation studies to identify a threshold of .01 CFI units for 
statistically significant change across nested models.  In the present study both 
statistically significant change in the log-likelihood function and ∆CFI of .01 or greater 
will be used as criteria for evaluation of measurement invariance.   
The unconstrained model is essentially the combined fit of separate models fit to 
each of the sample halves, with all parameters free to vary.  This model is a test of the 
configural invariance of the model – whether the number of factors and division of items 
onto factors fits equally well for both sample halves.  The measurement weights model 
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forces the loadings of each item on its latent factor to be equal across samples.  This 
model did not result in a significant decrement in fit relative to the unconstrained model, 
judging by change in both chi-squared and CFI.  This is an indication of metric 
invariance (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002) justifying the assumption that measurement of 
the latent variables is the same in both halves of the sample.   
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Appendix G.  Calculation of Proportion of Variance Explained by Each Latent Variable 
From Fornell and Larcker (1981) the proportion of extracted variance for each 
latent variable is represented by the formula:  [(Σ(sli2)]/[(Σ(sli2) + Σ(ei))] where sl is the 
standardized loading of each item in the construct and e = 1 - sl.  Standardized item 
loadings are shown in Figure 2. 
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Appendix H. Descriptive Statistics for Unit-Weighted Scales for Each Latent Construct 
Scale Mean SD 
1.  Equal opportunity  
     (1=Strongly agree / 5 = Strongly Disagree) 2.61 .83 
2.  Structural attributions wealth 
     (1 = Very often / 5 = Never) 2.29 .66 
3.  Structural attributions poverty 
     (1 = Very often / 5 = Never) 2.80 .83 
4.  Group-based attributions  
     (1 = Very important / 4 = Not at all important) 2.28 .65 
5.  Individual attributions poverty  
     (1 = Very often / 5 = Never) 2.59 .80 
6.  Government redistribution 
     (1=Strongly agree / 5 = Strongly Disagree) 3.47 1.00 
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Appendix I.  Median Splits for Four Moderator Variables 
There were four variables tested as moderators.  For each of these variables, 
because there were a large number of cases with the median value of the moderator, the 
component items for the latent variable were used to create the most even possible split 
of the sample.  The general procedure for all four latent variables was to examine the 
distribution of the indicator with the strongest loading for the construct.  For all of the 
latent variables with a five-point scale, responses 1-2 for the strongest loading item were 
coded as high systems analysis, and responses 3-5 were coded as low systems analysis 
(with the exception of the equal opportunity construct which was reverse-coded).  For 
latent variables with a four-point scale, values 1-2 were coded as high systems analysis 
and values 3-4 were coded as low systems analysis.   
For tests of moderation using multi-group modeling, the fully unconstrained 
model allows all parameters from the model to be estimated separately for the two 
structural attribution groups.  By contrast, the constrained model includes equality 
constraints on the direct effects of the five predictor latent variables on the redistribution 
outcome.  A significant decrease in fit from the unconstrained to the constrained model 
indicates that the effects of the predictors on the outcome need to be free to vary across 
the two structural attribution groups.   Note that a construct from the original 
measurement model is the grouping variable for this multi-group analysis, so that 
variable is not present in the model for either group, therefore these models are no longer 
nested in relation to the previous models. 
